英國對歐盟的出口占英國總出口量的42%，對美國的出口則僅占英國總出口量的18%。因此，從經(jīng)濟(jì)角度來講，英國退出歐洲海關(guān)聯(lián)盟，與美國簽訂自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定并不劃算。事實(shí)上，英國部分資本、對沖基金和類似的金融機(jī)構(gòu)不會因英國脫離歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體系而受到損失，但幾乎所有的制造業(yè)、汽車業(yè)、制藥業(yè)和大部分金融服務(wù)業(yè)則會損失慘重。此外，英國民眾將因此大量失業(yè)、生活水平下降。

正因如此，反對鮑里斯·約翰遜的斗爭在他就職之前就開始了。鮑里斯·約翰遜的計(jì)劃之一是壓制脫歐反對者，具體措施是就職后他將在10月31日——英國本應(yīng)離開歐盟的日期前暫停議會。從本質(zhì)上講，這是一場“軟”政變。然而，國會以多數(shù)票否決了這一提議，視之為非法行為——約翰遜所在的保守黨就有40多名議員反對支持這一提議。

因此，為呼應(yīng)美國利益，約翰遜計(jì)劃在10月31日把英國從歐洲政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)體系（歐洲海關(guān)聯(lián)盟）脫離出來，即“無協(xié)議脫歐”。但既然暫停議會的提議被否決，就不清楚約翰遜在議會中的支持者是否占多數(shù)。因此，這一問題將在秋季引發(fā)激烈的政治危機(jī)——二戰(zhàn)以來英國最嚴(yán)重的政治危機(jī)。鑒于此，這場斗爭的結(jié)果不僅將決定英國脫歐與否，而且將影響英國在香港、華為等中國其他問題上的立場。

中國的外交政策不允許其干涉他國內(nèi)政，這與國際準(zhǔn)則一致——而英國正式粗暴地違反了這一規(guī)則，干涉香港問題。但這并不意味著中國不會被其他國家發(fā)生的事所影響，有時(shí)候這種聯(lián)系可能在表面上不是很明顯，但這種影響會與社會力量的基本發(fā)展緊密相連。中國媒體已經(jīng)清楚地注意到在最近的香港挑釁事件中英國那種咄咄逼人的態(tài)度。此外，中國媒體也注意到了圍繞英國脫歐而不斷增長的危機(jī)，但是鮮有媒體注意到兩者的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系。

顯然，基于上述原因，在未來幾個(gè)月里，英國將面臨來自其內(nèi)部的親特朗普和親美勢力的巨大沖擊，他們希望英國更加堅(jiān)定地追隨美國。如果這些勢力取得勝利，那么這對英國和中國（包括香港問題）來說，都將是一個(gè)打擊。也許中國不會直接干預(yù)，但中國很有必要仔細(xì)關(guān)注并清楚地了解這些事件所揭示出來的問題。

附：本文英文原文

Brexit explains why Britain has played such a provocative role in Hong Kong

On Tuesday Britain announced that Boris Johnson became its new Prime Minister. This event has significant implications for China - including for Hong Kong and for Huawei. Johnson’s project is to turn Britain into the equivalent of the 51st state of the US – but without the right to vote! Because some Chinese media wrongly believe that Brexit is a domestic British issue, without major implications for China, or wrongly treated Boris Johnson as some sort of amiable fool, it is necessary to correct this and see clearly what is taking place and its consequences for China. In particular the international forces involved make clear why Britain has played such a provocative role in recent events in Hong Kong.

Britain’s role in Hong Kong

A specific feature of the present provocations in Hong Kong is clearly the role played by Britain – which has made a series of statements attempting to interfere in Hong Kong affairs, in contradiction to the 1997 ending of Britain’s colonial rule and return of Hong Kong to China. The Chinese Ambassador in London, and the Chinese foreign ministry in Beijing, have strongly replied to these. It is clear a certain division of labour has been created in attacks on China with the US concentrating on the trade war and Britain playing a particularly provocative role in relation to Hong Kong. But, as will be seen, this fa?ade conceals the reality. Britain’s provocative policy is carried out by forces increasingly aligned with the US – it is not a difference in substance but merely a technical division of labour.

This present provocative role by Britain is particularly striking because it forms a sharp contrast to the situation only a few years ago of the ‘golden period’ of China-UK relations when Cameron was British prime minister. Britain at that time became the first G7 country to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) despite US opposition. Xi Jinping made a highly successful visit to Britain. At that time Britain, in line with the 1997 settlement, largely refrained from provocative intervention in Hong Kong. What therefore explains the change, and how is this related to Boris Johnson becoming British Prime Minister?

The answer to this question lies in the international and social dynamic behind Brexit – which is not at all a purely domestic British issue and has significant implications for China. Cameron’s development of the ‘golden period’ of British-China relations was directly tied to the fact that he represented that wing of British business which strongly supported Britain’s membership of the EU and he was a fierce opponent of Brexit – Cameron campaigned entirely against Brexit in the 2016 referendum and resigned because of his defeat in the referendum. Within that framework Cameron developed what was a highly rational strategy from the viewpoint of both Britain’s population and British capitalism of positioning Britain as the key gateway for China into the EU.

Cameron’s strategy for attracting China’s investment to Britain

Britain had great advantages in pursuing Cameron’s strategy. The City of London is Europe’s most important financial centre. It is the world’s largest centre for foreign exchange dealing, ahead of New York, and has already established a position as the largest market for RMB trading outside China. English is also the first foreign language most Chinese citizens learn and therefore Britain is much easier for many Chinese firms to operate in than Germany or France. Britain is a very important telecommunications centre and Cameron could ensure Huawei was able to participate in this important British market.

During the eight years I was in charge of London’s economic policy, from 2000-2008, I had numerous meetings with the financial companies of London and therefore knew personally how centrally they saw relations with China. A single anecdote sums this up - it was a joke among business circles of the City of London that it was very unfortunate that the Chinese Spring Festival was so close in time to the European Xmas, as after attending many dinners to mark Xmas they then had to attend many more to celebrate the Spring Festival and therefore it was impossible to control weight at that time of the year!

Cameron’s strategy was, therefore, extremely economically rational for British capitalism and Britain’s economic development. With many Chinese companies expanding abroad they saw Britain as a very suitable point of entry into the EU. Britain could gain from Chinese investment in addition to its already strong position as the financial centre of the EU - a real ‘win-win’ outcome for both Britain and China.

But to pursue such a strategy Cameron evidently needed calm and objective relations with China. This is the explanation of why during the ‘golden period’ Cameron therefore clearly tried to avoid becoming involved in provocations in Hong Kong.

The US against Cameron

But Cameron’s economic policy was totally unacceptable to those in the US who wanted to block China’s development. The days when Britain ruled the greatest Empire in the history of the world were, of course, long gone. But nevertheless, Britain remains a significant global economy – the sixth largest GDP in the world, with a high technological level and, in London, the most important international financial centre in the world outside the US.  For Britain to be pursuing a ‘win-win’ relation with China, which although it benefitted Britain also benefitted China, was therefore unacceptable for anti-China circles in the US – which is why the US so strongly opposed Britain joining the AIIB. The US opportunity to comprehensively disrupt Britain’s good relations with China came with Brexit - and the key role of Boris Johnson within this which has culminated in him becoming Prime Minister.

The historical position of the US in regard to Britain’s membership of the EU had been  to support this – as Britain was seen as a reliable US ally to influence EU policy. But Trump reversed this policy to instead favour disrupting the EU, therefore arguing for Britain to withdraw from the EU, and he forged close personal links with anti-EU forces in Britain.

This change in US policy to the EU necessarily followed from Trump overall international strategy. The policy of Obama and Hilary Clinton had been to seek to form a broad ‘a(chǎn)nti-China alliance’ – to achieve which the US had to make concessions to its allies, which included good relations with the EU. Trump, however, considered the US could not afford such concessions and that instead allies should be forced to increase the resources they supplied to the US - so that the US would be strengthened in its confrontation with China. Because Germany was unwilling to transfer its resources to the US, through increased defence spending and acceptance of US tariffs, and Germany dominated the EU, therefore Trump concluded that Brexit must be pursued to weaken the EU. Support for Brexit was therefore integrally linked to Trump’s strategy to attack on China. To pursue  this strategy Trump created close relations with Brexit supporters in Britain – the first British politician to meet Trump after his election as President was not from the governing Conservative Party but Nigel Farage who is now leader of the Brexit Party (see photo)

Boris Johnson links to the US

Boris Johnson fitted perfectly into Trump’s strategy. Johnson was born in the US and was a US citizen,  as well as British citizen, until 2016 - although Johnson pursued his political career in Britain. Johnson’s policy was of strong subordination to the US – being, for example, a firm supporter of the invasion of Iraq.

Johnson was also ultra-derogatory about Chinese civilization writing: ‘high Chinese culture and art are almost all imitative of western forms: Chinese concert pianists are technically brilliant, but brilliant at Schubert and Rachmaninov. Chinese ballerinas dance to the scores of Diaghilev. The number of Chinese Nobel prizes won on home turf is zero, though there are of course legions of bright Chinese trying to escape to Stanford and Caltech.

‘There are Chinatowns and takeaways all over the world, but in Britain the culinary impact of China is dwarfed by the [Indian] subcontinent…. It is hard to think of a single Chinese sport at the Olympics, compared with the umpteen invented by Britain, including ping-pong [table tennis], I'll have you know, which originated at [British] upper-class dinner tables… 

‘The Chinese have a script so fiendishly complicated that they cannot produce a proper keyboard for it… 

‘As for military might – hard power – our fears are again overdone. The Chinese may have 2.5 million men in uniform, but of the long-range missiles you need to be a global power Beijing can wield only 20, which would make for a pretty brief fireworks display.’

Someone who was firm supporter of the US, and was derogatory about China, was, of course, an ideal candidate for Trump – who therefore duly went out of his way to publicly praise Johnson.