Club點(diǎn)評(píng)：6月25日，中美研究中心ICAS執(zhí)行主任、北京對(duì)話特約專家洪農(nóng)，在南華早報(bào)發(fā)表題為《Legal moves turn South China Sea into a public image battleground》（法律舉動(dòng)將南海變成了公關(guān)戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)）的評(píng)論文章。洪農(nóng)指出，菲律賓再次利用國(guó)際仲裁和申訴作為公關(guān)工具，旨在提升自身形象并挑戰(zhàn)中國(guó)的一貫主張。但是，如果某些國(guó)家僅在對(duì)自己有利時(shí)才援引國(guó)際法，它們可能會(huì)被指責(zé)虛偽。國(guó)際法的復(fù)雜性和靈活詮釋性，使得各國(guó)都能夠操縱法律論點(diǎn)以符合自身敘述。中國(guó)在解決南海爭(zhēng)端問(wèn)題時(shí)，會(huì)堅(jiān)持原有的雙邊磋商，還是引入新的辦法？

同日，據(jù)報(bào)道，菲律賓外交部長(zhǎng)馬納羅表示，菲律賓希望與中國(guó)就南海問(wèn)題進(jìn)行對(duì)話，以解決分歧。

最近，中國(guó)和菲律賓在南沙群島仁愛(ài)礁的沖突，加劇了南海的緊張局勢(shì)。自1999年以來(lái)，菲律賓通過(guò)故意擱淺在那里的二戰(zhàn)時(shí)服役的坦克登陸艦“馬德雷山號(hào)”（BRP Sierra Madre）及駐扎其上的一小支海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)員，維持著在該海域的存在感，以及對(duì)該地區(qū)的領(lǐng)土主張。

中國(guó)用“九段線”來(lái)申明對(duì)該島礁的主權(quán)，并曾采取行動(dòng)阻止菲律賓將仁愛(ài)礁變成軍事基地，還試圖阻止菲律賓的補(bǔ)給船抵達(dá)“馬德雷山號(hào)”。

菲律賓則對(duì)中方的行動(dòng)提出了外交抗議，并尋求增強(qiáng)自身的軍事和后勤能力。菲律賓政府重申了在仁愛(ài)礁附近繼續(xù)活動(dòng)的決心，還呼吁國(guó)際社會(huì)給予支持。中國(guó)則指責(zé)菲律賓故意制造沖突事件以博取更多國(guó)際關(guān)注和同情。

菲律賓采取的這些行動(dòng)，使南海局勢(shì)更加復(fù)雜。盡管菲律賓目前沒(méi)有正式宣布要對(duì)中國(guó)發(fā)起新一輪仲裁聽(tīng)證，但有報(bào)道稱，這方面的討論已經(jīng)開(kāi)始了。

為了反對(duì)其認(rèn)為的中國(guó)的非法行為，菲律賓可能會(huì)尋求仲裁。更有甚者，菲律賓或?qū)?qiáng)調(diào)他們擔(dān)心中國(guó)的有關(guān)活動(dòng)可能對(duì)海底環(huán)境造成的破壞。

6月14日，菲律賓請(qǐng)求大陸架界限委員會(huì)（CLCS）—一個(gè)根據(jù)《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》設(shè)立的國(guó)際機(jī)構(gòu)—承認(rèn)其大陸架外部界限在西巴拉望地區(qū)延伸超過(guò)200海里。盡管CLCS沒(méi)有執(zhí)法權(quán)，但它可以研究各國(guó)延伸大陸架主張的技術(shù)細(xì)節(jié)并提供建議。

這一尋求仲裁和向CLCS提交申請(qǐng)并舉的做法，反映了菲律賓利用國(guó)際法律機(jī)制來(lái)維護(hù)自身主張、并挑戰(zhàn)中國(guó)在南海的一貫海域主張的戰(zhàn)略。

這些法律舉動(dòng)的時(shí)機(jī)和有效性表明，各國(guó)將國(guó)際法視為公關(guān)工具，讓其同時(shí)服務(wù)于戰(zhàn)略和外交目的。這一點(diǎn)在菲律賓與中國(guó)之間的南海爭(zhēng)端中尤為突出。

這一方法提供了幾個(gè)潛在優(yōu)勢(shì)。首先，許多國(guó)家將援引國(guó)際法標(biāo)榜為“基于規(guī)則的國(guó)際秩序”的擁護(hù)者，從而獲得國(guó)際社會(huì)的支持和同情。對(duì)于菲律賓來(lái)說(shuō)，使用《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》來(lái)框定其在南海的主張可以增強(qiáng)自己的道德和法律站位。

菲律賓將自己描繪成在世界舞臺(tái)上遵紀(jì)守法、負(fù)責(zé)任的形象，從而加強(qiáng)自己在談判中的立場(chǎng)。同時(shí)，它對(duì)于中國(guó)“霸凌”行為和所謂環(huán)境破壞活動(dòng)的“南海行為敘事”，可以在其國(guó)內(nèi)外聽(tīng)眾中引起強(qiáng)烈共鳴。這提升了菲律賓領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的形象，讓他們看上去是敢于挑戰(zhàn)一個(gè)強(qiáng)國(guó)的“勇者”。

當(dāng)前爭(zhēng)端的核心法律問(wèn)題圍繞條約法（《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》）以及國(guó)際習(xí)慣法的歷史權(quán)利之間的關(guān)系；菲律賓強(qiáng)調(diào)前者，而中國(guó)立場(chǎng)基于后者。然而，有時(shí)國(guó)際社會(huì)對(duì)中國(guó)的立場(chǎng)充耳不聞。

其次，有一種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，國(guó)際法為較小或力量較弱的國(guó)家提供了一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)更強(qiáng)大對(duì)手的平臺(tái)。通過(guò)強(qiáng)調(diào)其堅(jiān)持原則和國(guó)際準(zhǔn)則，菲律賓旨在抵消中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事力量?jī)?yōu)勢(shì)。2016年有利于菲利賓的仲裁庭裁決似乎傳遞了這樣一個(gè)信息：法律訴訟可以把小國(guó)的聲音放大。

這種觀點(diǎn)還認(rèn)為，中國(guó)退出仲裁程序的決定，影響了其合法海洋主張的正當(dāng)性。因此，中國(guó)被描繪成了一個(gè)試圖對(duì)小國(guó)施加軍事和經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力的大國(guó)。

此外，戰(zhàn)略性地利用國(guó)際法可以影響國(guó)際輿論并左右其他國(guó)家的外交政策。通過(guò)強(qiáng)調(diào)中國(guó)不遵守國(guó)際裁決，菲律賓正在影響全球輿論，并可能在鼓勵(lì)其他國(guó)家支持其立場(chǎng)，從而在外交上孤立中國(guó)。

然而，菲律賓真的在追求法律結(jié)果嗎？菲律賓向CLCS提交的程序無(wú)可爭(zhēng)議。任何簽訂了《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》的沿海國(guó)家都有權(quán)向CLCS提交申請(qǐng)。同樣，中國(guó)在6月18日向聯(lián)合國(guó)秘書(shū)長(zhǎng)提交了一份照會(huì)，提出，任何關(guān)于南海爭(zhēng)議水域的提交都不應(yīng)被考慮。

照會(huì)內(nèi)容 圖源：互聯(lián)網(wǎng)

其實(shí)，將國(guó)際法作為公關(guān)工具也有其局限性。如果某些國(guó)家僅在對(duì)自己有利時(shí)才援引國(guó)際法，它們可能會(huì)被指責(zé)虛偽。國(guó)際法的復(fù)雜性和靈活詮釋性，使得各國(guó)能夠操縱法律論點(diǎn)以符合自身敘述。

此外，國(guó)際法通常缺乏強(qiáng)有力的執(zhí)行機(jī)制，這意味著在法庭或仲裁庭上的勝利，可能不會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)化為現(xiàn)實(shí)中的改變。2016年的仲裁結(jié)果未能對(duì)解決菲律賓和中國(guó)之間的主要矛盾做出積極貢獻(xiàn)，反而進(jìn)一步加劇了兩國(guó)間的緊張局勢(shì)。那么，中國(guó)在解決南海爭(zhēng)端問(wèn)題時(shí)，會(huì)堅(jiān)持原有的雙邊磋商，還是引入新的辦法？

（翻譯：王奕涵  核譯：韓樺）

英文原文：

Recent clashes between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal have heightened tensions in the South China Sea. The Philippines has maintained a presence there since 1999 by stationing a small contingent of marines on the BRP Sierra Madre, a deliberately grounded World War II-era ship symbolising its claims over the area.

China also claims the shoal based on its nine-dash line. It has taken actions to prevent the Philippines from turning the shoal into a military base and attempted to prevent resupply boats from the Philippines from reaching the Sierra Madre.

In response to Chinese actions, the Philippines has lodged diplomatic protests and sought to bolster its military and logistical capabilities. The Philippine government has reiterated its commitment to maintaining its presence at Second Thomas Shoal and has called for international support. Meanwhile, China has accused the Philippines of staging incidents to gain more international attention and sympathy.

The Philippines has taken further actions that add to the complexity of the South China Sea status quo. While there haven’t been any official announcements regarding initiating new arbitration hearings against China, reports suggest there have been discussions to that end.

The Philippines might seek arbitration to challenge specific Chinese actions it sees as illegal. Additionally, the Philippines might aim to highlight concerns about potential environmental damage from Chinese activities on the seabed.

On June 14, the Philippines requested that the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) – an international body established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) – recognise that the outer limits of its continental shelf extended beyond 200 nautical miles in the West Palawan region. Although the CLCS lacks enforcement power, it provides recommendations by reviewing the technical details of a country’s extended continental shelf claims.

This dual approach of seeking arbitration and submitting claims to the CLCS reflects the Philippines’ strategy of using international legal mechanisms to uphold its claims and challenge China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea.

However, the timing and effectiveness of these legal actions suggest countries see international law as a tool for public image campaigns, serving both strategic and diplomatic purposes. This is particularly evident in the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines and China.

This approach offers several potential advantages. First, invoking international law lets countries position themselves as adherents to a rules-based international order, garnering support and sympathy from the global community. For the Philippines, framing its claims in the South China Sea through Unclos enhances its moral and legal standing.

The Philippines portrays itself as a law-abiding and responsible actor on the world stage, strengthening its negotiating position. The narratives of China’s bullying behaviour and environmentally damaging activities resonate strongly with domestic and international audiences. This boosts the image of Filipino leaders as courageous individuals willing to confront a powerful nation.

The central legal issue revolves around the relationship between Unclos as treaty law, which the Philippines emphasises, and historic rights as customary international law, upon which China bases its claims. However, China’s side of the story can sometimes go unheard within the international community.

Second, there is the notion that international law provides smaller or less powerful countries with a platform to challenge larger, more powerful adversaries. By emphasising its commitment to principles and international norms, the Philippines aims to offset China’s economic and military strength. The 2016 arbitration panel ruling in the Philippines’ favour seemed to send a message how legal recourse can amplify the voice of smaller nations.

Meanwhile, China finds itself in a weakened position before the international community. Its decision to walk away from the arbitration proceedings undermined the legitimacy of its legal maritime claims. Consequently, China is portrayed as a major state seeking to exert its military and economic power over smaller states.

Furthermore, the strategic use of international law can shape international opinion and influence foreign policy decisions of other states. By highlighting China’s non-compliance with international rulings, the Philippines is swaying global opinion and potentially encouraging other nations to support its stance, isolating China diplomatically.

However, is the Philippines truly pursuing a legal outcome? The procedures of the Philippines’ submission to the CLCS are beyond question. Any coastal state that has ratified Unclos has the right to submit applications to the CLCS. Similarly, China sent a note verbale on June 18 to the United Nations secretary general, arguing that any submissions regarding the disputed waters in the South China Sea should not be considered.

Meanwhile, using international law as a tool for public image campaigns has its limitations. Countries could be accused of hypocrisy if they invoke international law only when it is convenient. The complexity and interpretative nature of international law allow countries to manipulate legal arguments to fit their narratives.

Additionally, international law often lacks robust enforcement mechanisms, meaning victories in courts or tribunals might not translate into real change on the ground. The outcome of the 2016 arbitration did not make a meaningful contribution to resolving the main issues between the Philippines and China but instead further escalated tensions.

Another implication is whether China will turn to international litigation or arbitration to pursue its maritime claims. Will China’s conventional approach of bilateral negotiations and consultations remain its preferred method for settling interstate disputes?

Alternatively, will it come to accept that third-party dispute resolution has a pivotal role to play in resolving issues with neighbouring countries? The Philippines’ legal manoeuvring could prompt China to re-evaluate its usual approach to resolving maritime disputes in the South China Sea.