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伊萬(wàn)·季莫菲耶夫:中國(guó)和俄羅斯都必須面對(duì)“兩個(gè)西方”
以下為采訪原文:
Helen:What do you make of the most recent breakdown between Zelensky with President Trump and JD Vance?
Ivan Timofeev:Of course, what we see is completely different to what we got used to. It's a very unusual situation, taking into account the recent 3 years of extensive support by the US and US allies towards Ukraine. Now, the new president has a completely different view that peace is demanded, he is not going to tolerate the situation where his junior partner raises his conditions. The point is that if you're a junior partner, then you should follow the line of the senior partner. If the senior partner changes its mind, you should change your mind as well. In that meeting in the White House, the word should was changed into the word must.
That was quite a significant diplomatic defeat for Volodymir Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, which would probably undermine significantly his positions in Ukraine at home.
So we will see what would be the further consequences for the peace settlement in Ukraine. How fast would it happen for the conflict is still quite complicated. The negotiation positions of the US and Russia are still not clear, taking the into account that the negotiations are on the very start. But what we see is quite bad news for the leader of Ukraine.
Helen:Given you have been against the Ukraine war before and after February 2022, how have you opinions and comments evolved during the past 3 years?
Ivan Timofeev:You see, I was very concerned by the military development due to very different reasons. One of them was the risks of further escalation in relations between Russia and the West. This local conflict could turn into something bigger. At some points, we were close to this escalation when the West supplied mid-range cruise missiles to Ukraine. Russia used intermediate range missile against Ukraine. So quite a dangerous situation.
One other reason was that there was a huge risk of economic deterioration. There, I was happy that the negative forecasts on the economic situation, both in Russia and globally, it did not come true. On the one hand, Russia showed significant resilience to the economic pressure. On the other hand, we managed to avoid global energy crisis, food security crisis, et cetera.
Now, what is advisable? What is reasonable is to use this opportunity in Russia US relations to stop the military conflict. But at the same time, this resolution must take into account their conditions which provoke this conflict. It should take into account the demands of Russia. Otherwise, we will hardly avoid the new conflict in the future.
Helen:What are the demands from Russia, in your opinion?
Ivan Timofeev:One of the major demands is the non-aligned status of Ukraine. It's demilitarization in a sense that it shouldn't be a weapon in the hands of the Western partners of Kiev and should not pose a threat to Russia in its closest neighborhood.
One other thing is about people, respect to the diversity of the population, with respect to the linguistic diversity, with zero tolerance to radical nationalism. There is praise of those who cooperated with Nazi Germany during the second world war; there should be zero tolerance to the falsification of history, including the history of the second world war.
In sum this is the non-aligned, the neutrality, the demilitarization, the issue of radical nationalism and the respect to diversity of the population of Ukraine, I see it in this way, probably we will see another least list by Russian official diplomacy. This is just my expert opinion.
Helen:I believe some of the demands will be proposed. How do you envision the demands or the negotiation process down the road, first between Russia and the United States? There is more than Ukraine crisis between Russia and the United States, a lot of topics will be covered between your diplomatic channels.
Ivan Timofeev:The process may be quite complicated, because the conflict is complex, and this is not just about Ukraine. This is also about wider security architecture and the shortcomings of this architecture. There, by the way, it was from the very start of the conflict the point of the Chinese diplomacy, which stressed the shortcomings of European security architecture, which was one of the factors which actually neglected the security interests of Russia, which undermined the principle of indivisible security.
The long-term settlement demands progress in the realm of wider security framework.
We have already seen in the media that there may be several parameters of this settlement, including the elections in Ukraine, which may be an important internal policy prerequisite for further political development around this conflict. Their discussion on the territorial division line takes into account the status quo on the ground and take into account the demands on Russia on the one hand, the military situation in the field, and the discussion of political parameters like the nonaligned status of Ukraine, its relations with NATO. We know that the one of the demands of Russia is the non-membership of Ukraine in NATO.
European allies of Ukraine and Ukraine itself may try to promote the idea of the presence on the territory of Ukraine of foreign troops, which would guarantee the security. But this is and an unacceptable proposal for Russia, because that would mean that Ukraine will be occupied by foreign troops, regardless of the reason. Any so-called peacekeeping mission demands the agreement, the support of the UN security council and of the wider international community.
The west cannot substitute the international community. The west is big, it's influential, but it's not the international community. It cannot provide the widest mandate for peacekeeping operation. The only legitimate source of peacekeeping operations is the United Nations, taking into account the Russian position, Chinese position, would hardly adopt the emergence of any western contingent on the territory of Ukraine.
Trump is quite transparent and blunt on the issue, saying that he will not support militarily the European forces if they are in a clash with Russians within this mission. So Americans are not supportive. And this is rather good and bad, because this emergence of foreign troops in Ukraine may cause further escalation and direct clash between Russia and NATO, which is not a reasonable scenario.
That's why we began about my perception of risks connected to this military conflict. And as I mentioned, the major risk was the escalation of the local conflict to a greater class between Russia and NATO to the third world war, actually. If the western forces emerge in Ukraine, this would make this risk remain on table.
Helen:You actually mentioned the food crisis, energy crisis, as top concerns of not having the Ukraine war in the first place. So would some economic concerns, some humanitarian assistance be one of the parameters of resolving this crisis in the longer term?
Ivan Timofeev:This is an important question. One of the issues is restoration of international supply chains, distorted by sanctions and distorted by restrictive measures. I wouldn't say that they play a critical role now. Russia and its partners managed to bypass these sanctions. It must be stated that West itself provided humanitarian exemptions to sanctions. So to a large extent, the world managed to avoid the humanitarian impacts of this conflict on food security and energy security.
But on the other hand, there is another humanitarian issue. This is the issue of overcoming the consequences of war in Ukraine and in those Russian regions which suffered from the war and from this military conflict. I mean demining, I mean restoration of the infrastructure, help to those who lost their relatives on both sides. By the way, this would be a huge burden for both economies, for both Ukrainian and Russians.
Helen:Which leads deeper to your expertise in the economic field. How has Russia managed to keep its economy running and resilient under Western sanctions, in general? And at the same time, what has been some of the challenges, for example, with inflation and others down the road? And what do you think of some of the proposal during the Riyadh meeting about Western investment resumption, and its impact on Chinese investment in Russia?
Ivan Timofeev:The resilience of the Russian economy turned to be a surprise, even to Russians themselves; to a large extent, this was the result of preparatory work conducted by the bank of Russia, by the government of Russia.
Several years prior to the special military preparation in Ukraine, we created our own system of financial messaging, our own payment system. We became independent on the Western-led services in this area, which allowed us to maintain financial stability after emergence of this sanctions tsunami.
On the other hand, we managed to rebuild quickly our own industry in a number of areas, especially in the military, in the dual use product productions. Our trade ties with China and other friendly states, but considerably with China, also helped to diminish the shocks connected to trade and to imports, including of consumption goods. China kept an unbiased and objective position, China is not a part of military alliances, and it didn't take any side in the military sense. But China has never distorted the market relations between our countries due to sanctions and even promoted the development of these relations under this sanctions war. And it was one of the critical factors. China turned out to be an important market for our commodities and for the goods which were kicked out from European and American markets; both China and India, by the way, India also played a major role in buying our oil and other commodities.
These were the major factors of resilience: good preparation, well crisis management by the government; by the way, the market structure of Russian economy, when entrepreneurs were responsible for themselves, they didn't wait for the help from above. And good diplomacy, most of all our relations with China.
As for the prospects of Western investments to the Russian economy, we should be cautious about this. First of all, in legal sense, these investments are still prohibited. In terms of US law, no new investment is possible to Russia, so these are just preliminary discussions, observations, et cetera.
If there is peace in Ukraine, on conditions which is satisfactory to all sides, and for us, the Russian interests are a priority. If this meets Russian interests, then it's reasonable to expect that some sanctions may be revoked, though we should be very cautious about this, because these revocations may be temporary, they may be rather in the logic of exemptions, but not long-term revocation of legal mechanisms, so we will leave this sanctions framework for quite a long time. This would mean that so some Western investments may emerge, may loom on the horizon if these exemptions on investment bans happen, but this sanctions framework will be a long-term risk.
Anyway, even if these investments occur, this is not a challenge for China at all. China emerged on the Russian market as a very strong player, and it will be very hard to anyone to outplay China on the Russian market.
Helen:I think both China and Russia mean have to face a two Wests. One is the United States, which probably will lift sanctions to some extent. But the European side will stick to those sanctions. So how should we deal with that?
Ivan Timofeev:You are absolutely right. If you look at recent sanctions, the European Union imposed its 16th package at the 3 years anniversary of the start of special military operation. But US abstained from sanctions. So we may see the situation where some allies are using sanctions, but the US is not.
I would say that, taking into account the centrality of the US in the international financial system, for us, US sanctions are more critical than European sanctions. If Europeans continue sanctions, this is less a problem than the reverse situation, where United States keep their sanctions and Europeans are revoking them.
And for Russia-China cooperation, US sanctions are much more critical than EU sanctions, because Chinese financial community is more concerned about US secondary sanctions than EU sanctions. If Americans are reducing, at least to some extent, this risk of financial sanctions, then Chinese financial community will be more favorable to promote cooperation and provide financial services to the trade between China and Russia.
Ivan Timofeev:We hope so. Yes. At some point, there might be talks regarding the BRICS currency or BRICS financial settlement, because Trump on one side may be resuming some of the discussions and negotiations with Russia, but he's so hostile towards a BRICS system, a BRICS currency.
Helen:But Russia, on the other hand, is strongly supportive of a BRICS currency. So down the road, what's your take on that?
Ivan Timofeev:Yes, Russia is a proponent of diversification of the international financial system. I must say that this is not just the Russian position, this is the position of India. By the way, India enjoys strong relations with the United States, and it enjoys globalization, but still, they are not against the diversification of international finance, understanding that monopoly is not the best way to do things.
China did a lot to preserve its own financial system and market from sanctions and from foreign interference. China is promoting yuan as a way for transactions. Yuan is still not a challenge to the US dollar, the share of yuan is not huge, and Chinese people's bank is quite cautious, avoiding acceleration this promotion of the yuan, trying to bolster this process with real economy and real economic affairs. Trying to cross the river, keeping in mind the rocks, step by step. It's a reasonable strategy.
Keeping this in mind, I do not think that the emergence of BRICS currency is a realistic scenario in the near future, not even in mid-term future, who would nominate this currency, how will it work, what would be the basis for this currency? It is still rather an idea than a practical solution.
In this sense, Trump is excessively alarmed, in my view. On the other hand, he understands that new centers of economy are emerging, that this is a challenge to the United States, and he will be quite assertive. In his first months of presidency, he avoided strong words in relations to China, but in his first term, he was quite aggressive. It's not a secret that he regards China as the major challenge, the threat to the US. So we'll see how he conducts his policy vis a vis Beijing.
Helen:For China and Russia, we attach great important to the bilateral relations, not only from the government level, but from academic, from other aspects of life. For Trump, my understanding is that he does not want to waste so much time, so much energy on Ukraine crisis. He has a lot more to do within the country.
So we know that prediction is really hard nowadays, but I still want you to predict, because his major objective is to deal with the Wall Street, not to put so much energy in the Ukraine crisis. He just wants to end it as soon as possible. So what's his policy?
Ivan Timofeev:He is looking at the future, not to the past. We may like Trump, we may dislike him. But what is clear is that the Cold War is a matter of the past and current Ukrainian crisis is the legacy of the Cold War. This is crystal clear. In a sense, we are still in this echo of the cold war.
For Trump, this is a matter of the past, but not a matter of the future. He tries to get rid of the outlays which relate to this past, and concentrate on the future. Indeed, he understands that in the conflict in Ukraine, he has no prospect of military victory over Russia. It's impossible to prevail over Russia at this current moment, and the further supplies of missiles to Ukraine would generate this dangerous situation, which I mentioned, at the beginning of our conversation, alarmed me pre-war to this military conflict.
He is looking at the future, he has a business background. He understands that this is a loss of money, hundreds of billions of dollars, which could be spent on the infrastructure in the US, on roads, airports, on modernization, whatever. These are not peanuts. These are big money. He just wants to save them and to redirect them. The question is, what would be the new direction.
Helen:From your expertise, if you can advise Trump regarding handling the domestic economic situation, what would be the advice you give to him?
Ivan Timofeev:I'm not an American, although I have been studying America for quite a long time. It's hard to make an advice for him. You see that the US is a rich country, it's a major economy. But still, inequality is still one of the problems, which is much more than in China, for instance, or in Russia. Though, this is not a Republican agenda to support the public services, to support the medical services for people, the education, et cetera, and Trump is Republican, this is not his agenda.
Still, as a Russian, as a citizen of the country where such services for people are important, I would probably, in my ideal world, these resources might be spent on people and their lives, education, health, et cetera, than on their military affairs. We'll see, but American people know better what to do with their country. We know better what to do at our homes.
Helen:Going back to Trump, China and Russia relations. Do you think that Trump might request Russia to stop using the RMB in its trade? And how might Russia respond to such a potential request?
Ivan Timofeev:Even if he demands this, I wouldn't say that this is doable. We already have quite a huge share of yuan in our trade. Getting back to some of the questions which I got from some of my Chinese counterparts, I would say that we will have this fear of deterioration of market relations for a long time; after this sanctions tsunami, it's very hard to believe that everything will be okay, and we shouldn't be prepared for another politicization, for another round of conflict.
This would mean that, for Moscow, it is reasonable to still hedge the risks, to still preserve its sovereignty over economic transactions and to have diversified means of trade, especially with China. Why should we use American currency in our bilateral relations? We should use our national currencies, Yuan and rubles. It's more reasonable.
We should explore more opportunities in this new system provided by both by China and Russia: CIPS is a great thing. It's not just a payment system; it's also a messaging system. And it is increasingly popular. Russian SPFS system of messaging also provides opportunities for Chinese banks to get in. Though the Chinese banks may be afraid of secondary sanctions, but still they have this opportunity. There may be some banks with higher appetite to risk could use this system.
The dollar is inevitably important in international finance. It's important for Chinese business, which uses dollar extensively, Chinese banks are using dollar extensively. This is the interest of China to use the Dollar, but by the way, Chinese diplomacy is very clear that China is not going to undermine globalization. Globalization is beneficial for China, so why should China ruin what is beneficial for everyone? Though, China has its own projects, like Belt and Road, like global security initiative, but it does not contradict the globalization process.
In this sense, the risks to politicization of US-led system will remain both for Russia and for China. It's reasonable to mitigate these risks, to work on alternative for mechanism, not just to fight against America for the sake of the fight against America. That's not the reason. When it's reasonable, when we can cooperate with Western partners, we should cooperate.
But when it comes to politicization and to discrimination of our interests or the interference into our domestic affairs, like Hong Kong, like Xinjiang, like Tibet, we see sanctions of the US on these issues. This is not the issue of the US, this is an internal issue of China. This is your country and your people, it's your policy. Why should someone else dictate to you what to do?
As we remember, Americans threatened the financial sanctions against banks who are connected to the situation in Hong Kong. Politically speaking, this is in intolerable. They didn't take a risk to do this, because China is too strong. They were afraid of the retaliation, that you will push back.
But still, this very threat of politicization of international finance remains. And we should be ready to this scenario. Last 3 years is a big lesson, not just to Russia, but to China as well.
Helen:Yes, always be prepared and become more resilient.
Ivan Timofeev:Yes, just be resilient and be self-confident, respecting others, no problem, and cooperating with others, but having an opportunity to do it on your own.
Helen:Yeah, this is a part of the principles of Chinese diplomacy. But we just need to carry out in a more sophisticated way.
Ivan Timofeev:Yeah, and China can afford this. China is a universe. China is so separate; it's a world in the world. By the way, that's why this national currency trade makes sense for China and Russia, due to the simple fact that Russia can buy everything in China, because China produces everything. If you have for yuan, you can buy whatever you want.
This is not the case in the trade with other friendly countries, which have less diversified economy, which are less developed in terms of industry, so we are much more limited in terms of the use of national currencies, we will inevitably have disbalances in trade.
One other thing is that China is increasingly independent of foreign suppliers in terms of industry. China increasingly has its own industrial goods, technologies, et cetera. When deciding on cooperation with foreign partners, China should not go to Washington and apply for a license and permission to supply something to Russia, China has its own. And the list of the products which it has on its own is increasing.
Helen:Yes. But China is being so humble. 3 years ago, the only missing puzzle might be in the high tech industry, like the chips. Nowadays, we have so many breakthroughs. They only thing I can think is the aircrafts, the big commercial jetliners, but we are moving so fast towards this direction as well.
Ivan Timofeev:Chinese people are humble and modest, which is a part of the national character which deserves high respect. I talked many times with my Chinese friends on technology and finance, they say that, yes, we got some success, but still we need to learn from Americans in this and that, they are still strong in this and that, and we should go there and look at what they are doing. We should learn their competent practices.
This is a reasonable strategy where you achieve success, but you are not closing doors. You are not proud of yourself. You still keep this pen in the pocket, writing and learning from others. This is an essential part legacy of your culture, of your civilization, which is a huge competence in such turbulent times.
Helen:Thank you for saying so, so just keep learning Chinese.
Ivan Timofeev:I should,應(yīng)該學(xué)習(xí)漢語(yǔ).
俄羅斯國(guó)際事務(wù)委員會(huì)(RIAC,全稱(chēng)Russian International Affairs Council)成立于2010年,是俄羅斯最具影響力的外交與國(guó)際關(guān)系智庫(kù)之一。RIAC致力于推動(dòng)國(guó)際政策研究、促進(jìn)全球?qū)υ挘瑓R聚政府官員、學(xué)者及外交專(zhuān)家,就地緣政治、安全、經(jīng)濟(jì)合作等議題提供政策建議。該委員會(huì)與全球知名智庫(kù)廣泛合作,旨在提升俄羅斯在國(guó)際事務(wù)中的影響力,并促進(jìn)國(guó)際社會(huì)對(duì)俄羅斯外交政策的理解與互動(dòng)。
- 原標(biāo)題:美俄“握手”但難題仍在,中俄攜手更上層樓 本文僅代表作者個(gè)人觀點(diǎn)。
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