2013年TED大會(huì)上，李世默發(fā)表了頗受矚目的演講，其中重復(fù)了他在此前多篇文章中論述的觀點(diǎn)。李世默認(rèn)為中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和國(guó)力將持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)，一黨執(zhí)政的中國(guó)模式將趨于完善，但中國(guó)絕不會(huì)嘗試向外輸出自己的價(jià)值觀和政治模式。4月26日，美國(guó)百人會(huì)第23屆年會(huì)在舊金山召開(kāi)，今年的主題是“求同存異”。會(huì)上，李世默與《赫芬頓郵報(bào)》旗下的《世界郵報(bào)》（The World Post）專(zhuān)欄作家馬特•希恩（Matt Sheehan）對(duì)話，以《中國(guó)為何能贏在太平洋》為題，刊發(fā)于今日的《世界郵報(bào)》上，主題包括中國(guó)在領(lǐng)土問(wèn)題上的立場(chǎng)，國(guó)際秩序的演變，以及中國(guó)政治制度的前景。以下為馬特·希恩與李世默對(duì)話。

馬特·希恩對(duì)話李世默

馬特•希恩：從奧巴馬總統(tǒng)的日本之行，和他就烏克蘭危機(jī)等的表態(tài)看，有跡象表明美國(guó)正試圖對(duì)盟友表示更大的支持，在各種沖突中為他們助威。而美國(guó)在敘利亞和克里米亞危機(jī)中的表現(xiàn)眾所周知, 您認(rèn)為當(dāng)下美國(guó)做的這些新的表態(tài)還有作用嗎？

李世默：對(duì)您的問(wèn)題，我沒(méi)有直接的答案。不過(guò)在美國(guó)，口惠而實(shí)不至是政客的天性，他們總是輕易許諾，但很少兌現(xiàn)。在美國(guó)的選舉中，人們對(duì)此已司空見(jiàn)慣，但這一現(xiàn)象正擴(kuò)散到國(guó)際政治中。喬治•凱南是一位偉大的戰(zhàn)略家，冷戰(zhàn)初期，他為美國(guó)一手打造了遏制戰(zhàn)略。冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后，北約和歐盟不斷東擴(kuò)，也正是凱南警告這將鑄成大錯(cuò)，他說(shuō)美國(guó)盡管志得意滿地到處派發(fā)安全保證，但事實(shí)上它既無(wú)力也無(wú)心真正兌現(xiàn)。今天的局勢(shì)，證明凱南不幸言中。凱南已去，美國(guó)恐怕再?zèng)]有這樣清醒的戰(zhàn)略家了。

喬治•凱南是一位偉大的戰(zhàn)略家，冷戰(zhàn)初期，他為美國(guó)一手打造了遏制戰(zhàn)略。

馬特•希恩：克里米亞危機(jī)是否會(huì)影響中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對(duì)亞太問(wèn)題的估計(jì)？比如，是否會(huì)鼓勵(lì)他們采取更堅(jiān)決的姿態(tài)？

李世默：我想影響是有限的?？死锩讈單C(jī)只是次要的, 決定性的因素在美國(guó)自身。美國(guó)人口占世界的4.5%，經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)值不到20%，但軍費(fèi)開(kāi)支高達(dá)全球一半，在世界各地頻頻征戰(zhàn)。冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后僅僅一代人多一點(diǎn)的時(shí)間，美國(guó)就債臺(tái)高筑，產(chǎn)業(yè)空心化，中產(chǎn)階級(jí)萎縮，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施失修，教育資金匱乏，社會(huì)契約失去合法性。顯而易見(jiàn)，這種局面是難以為繼的。美國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略重心搖擺不定，先是亞洲，接著是中東，然后是烏克蘭，最后又一無(wú)所獲地回到起點(diǎn)。與此同時(shí), 美國(guó)民眾對(duì)重建本國(guó)社會(huì)基礎(chǔ)的訴求與日俱增。這才是影響中國(guó)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)戰(zhàn)略思考的重要趨勢(shì)。

馬特•希恩：關(guān)于中美關(guān)系的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展，您強(qiáng)調(diào)有序競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、戰(zhàn)略合作和相互尊重各自的影響區(qū)域。就此，您如何看美國(guó)在亞太的角色？

李世默：在亞太地區(qū)，有些國(guó)家是美國(guó)的“保護(hù)國(guó)”，其中最大的是日本，菲律賓也名列其中。美國(guó)為這些“保護(hù)國(guó)”提供軍事保障，而有些美國(guó)”保護(hù)國(guó)”和中國(guó)有各種利益, 文化和戰(zhàn)略上的沖突。問(wèn)題在于，中國(guó)作為一個(gè)崛起中的大國(guó), 能否在其周邊地區(qū)有序地建立合理的影響區(qū)域？這個(gè)歷史悠久的大國(guó)，未來(lái)能否和平地重返其在亞太的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位？在這個(gè)過(guò)程中，美國(guó)又會(huì)扮演什么樣的角色？

馬特•希恩：您曾強(qiáng)調(diào)中共的合法性既來(lái)源于它帶領(lǐng)中國(guó)實(shí)現(xiàn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)成就，也建立在中共領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的民族解放運(yùn)動(dòng)，最終結(jié)束了列強(qiáng)侵略的“百年國(guó)恥”的歷史地位上。在與日本的領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端上，中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將遭遇兩難挑戰(zhàn)，要么不惜經(jīng)濟(jì)滑坡的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)動(dòng)武開(kāi)戰(zhàn)，要么放棄民族核心利益并妥協(xié)讓步。就您來(lái)看，中共的決策層會(huì)作何決斷呢？

李世默：的確，中共的合法性有賴于保持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)與保衛(wèi)民族利益。在您假設(shè)的挑戰(zhàn)中，這兩大目標(biāo)很難兼顧，這將考驗(yàn)中共決策層的政治決斷。要兼顧兩者而不偏廢，確實(shí)要求相當(dāng)高的政治智慧，而迄今為止中共決策層的表現(xiàn)十分出色。如果一如既往，未來(lái)兩者還會(huì)相得益彰。

中國(guó)最近在南海和東海問(wèn)題上更趨堅(jiān)決，很多分析家認(rèn)為其結(jié)果對(duì)中國(guó)是負(fù)面的，我認(rèn)為那是誤判。事實(shí)很明顯，中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略是積極改變對(duì)其不利的現(xiàn)有格局，同時(shí)避免軍事沖突。 在與日本、菲律賓的領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端上，中國(guó)的表現(xiàn)是出色的。在黃巖島問(wèn)題上，中國(guó)實(shí)現(xiàn)了對(duì)那個(gè)區(qū)域的實(shí)際控制權(quán)， 但避免了戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。在釣魚(yú)島爭(zhēng)端上，中國(guó)改變了既往局勢(shì)，日本否認(rèn)領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端的存在，但中國(guó)的策略已將爭(zhēng)端成為現(xiàn)實(shí)， 中國(guó)的船只在釣魚(yú)島海域行駛， 挑戰(zhàn)了日本的實(shí)際控制權(quán)，這些戰(zhàn)略成果都是在一槍未發(fā)的條件下獲取的。

馬特•希恩：在您看來(lái)，美國(guó)開(kāi)創(chuàng)了戰(zhàn)后國(guó)際體系，但要繼續(xù)擔(dān)當(dāng)世界警察，維持利維坦的門(mén)面已力不從心。而中國(guó)盡管正在崛起，卻絕不會(huì)試圖取代美國(guó)的角色。既然中國(guó)與非洲、南美乃至全世界的經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)系日漸密切，中國(guó)還能堅(jiān)持孤立主義的外交政策嗎？

李世默：毋庸置疑，中國(guó)與全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的聯(lián)系越來(lái)越密切。從非洲、東南亞到世界各地，中國(guó)的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)政策正不斷向外拓展。但中國(guó)的觀念與美國(guó)截然不同。中國(guó)從未企圖建立一個(gè)普世體系并執(zhí)其牛耳。中國(guó)的政策目標(biāo)是與各國(guó)平等互惠地發(fā)展經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系，增進(jìn)中國(guó)民眾的福利。中國(guó)從未將自己的觀念強(qiáng)加于人，或?qū)ζ渌麌?guó)家的內(nèi)政指手劃腳，或兜售某種宏大敘事。中國(guó)一直致力于改善經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系，增進(jìn)本國(guó)民眾的福利。當(dāng)然，隨著其國(guó)力的上升, 中國(guó)的政策將趨于強(qiáng)勢(shì)，但必須看到這與美國(guó)的世界觀有本質(zhì)區(qū)別。

馬特•希恩：您深信中國(guó)政府有能力解決中國(guó)當(dāng)下面臨的諸多挑戰(zhàn)。眾所周知，這些挑戰(zhàn)包括環(huán)境惡化、腐敗引發(fā)的金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，在您看來(lái)，哪些挑戰(zhàn)是最嚴(yán)峻的？哪些是中共難以應(yīng)對(duì)的？

李世默：經(jīng)濟(jì)和腐敗問(wèn)題是兩大最緊迫的挑戰(zhàn)。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)高增長(zhǎng)，但既有的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式已走到盡頭。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)亟需結(jié)構(gòu)性改革，這意味著增速適當(dāng)放緩，期間將出現(xiàn)一些新問(wèn)題。兼顧結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整與增長(zhǎng)無(wú)疑是一大挑戰(zhàn)，但我相信在這方面中國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人能力出眾，足以應(yīng)對(duì)。

第二大挑戰(zhàn)是腐敗問(wèn)題。幾千年來(lái)，腐敗一直是中國(guó)政治中的頑癥，歷代王朝都深陷其中。因此，腐敗的根源非常復(fù)雜、頑固，很難找到永久根治的靈丹妙藥。當(dāng)前，中共正發(fā)動(dòng)一次運(yùn)動(dòng)式的反腐風(fēng)暴：猛藥去疴、重典治亂，在一定時(shí)期內(nèi)足以遏制腐??；當(dāng)然時(shí)過(guò)境遷，腐敗還會(huì)死灰復(fù)燃，到時(shí)又必須啟動(dòng)另一次反腐風(fēng)暴。目前，這次堪稱(chēng)建國(guó)以來(lái)最嚴(yán)厲的反腐風(fēng)暴，正漸入高潮。我相信這足以在短期內(nèi)遏制腐敗，但肯定無(wú)法根治。遠(yuǎn)期來(lái)看，政府內(nèi)部的制度化監(jiān)督機(jī)制將逐漸強(qiáng)化，當(dāng)然這是一個(gè)漸進(jìn)的過(guò)程。

馬特•希恩：習(xí)近平主席主政已有一年半的時(shí)間。對(duì)習(xí)近平主席的施政理念和舉措，您有何感想？最大的看點(diǎn)是什么？

李世默：我認(rèn)為習(xí)近平主席正在開(kāi)創(chuàng)中華人民共和國(guó)的第三個(gè)三十年。毋庸置疑，我認(rèn)為這具有劃時(shí)代的意義。第一個(gè)三十年是毛澤東時(shí)代；第二個(gè)三十年是鄧小平時(shí)代，在某種意義上江澤民和胡錦濤兩位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人繼承發(fā)揚(yáng)了鄧小平的事業(yè)。我的理解是，習(xí)近平主席開(kāi)創(chuàng)的新三十年，將是對(duì)前兩個(gè)三十年的辯證綜合。在剛過(guò)去的十八個(gè)月中，習(xí)近平主席讓全國(guó)民眾領(lǐng)會(huì)了他的施政理念和舉措，在經(jīng)濟(jì)改革、反腐、政治改革等各方面，其大刀闊斧的決心和舉措超越了所有人的預(yù)期。

馬特•希恩：迄今為止，習(xí)近平主席的政績(jī)相當(dāng)完美，但接下來(lái)改革的主要挑戰(zhàn)在哪里？

李世默：在我看來(lái)，最大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是難以預(yù)測(cè)的國(guó)際沖突。我相信中國(guó)政府能有效地調(diào)整和發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)，許多人強(qiáng)調(diào)中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，我承認(rèn)許多問(wèn)題確實(shí)存在，但相信政府能處理好。中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)正踏上一個(gè)新臺(tái)階，有充分的創(chuàng)新能力。

許多人聲稱(chēng)中國(guó)的一大困境是創(chuàng)新乏力，這簡(jiǎn)直是天方夜譚。今天的中國(guó)處于幾百年來(lái)最具有創(chuàng)新活力的時(shí)代。大約十八或十九年前，我開(kāi)始從事風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資時(shí)，主流觀點(diǎn)是中國(guó)永遠(yuǎn)產(chǎn)生不了市值十億美元的高科技公司。今天，阿里巴巴和騰訊的市值都已超過(guò)千億美元。至于十億美元市值的公司，走進(jìn)中關(guān)村的某家飯店，就隨處可見(jiàn)。

馬特•希恩：中國(guó)最大的高科技公司，都是在市場(chǎng)保護(hù)的環(huán)境中發(fā)展起來(lái)的。如果中國(guó)要培養(yǎng)更多有國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的公司，比如堪與WhatsApp競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的微信，中共是否會(huì)助其一臂之力？

李世默：在我看來(lái)，中共不是直接幫助高科技公司，而是提供更基礎(chǔ)性的支持，改善吸引人才和投資的環(huán)境。只要看看中國(guó)的大學(xué)，就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)其科研設(shè)施和人才與十年前相比，早已不可同日而語(yǔ)。在這樣的舞臺(tái)上，年輕的創(chuàng)新人才將不斷開(kāi)發(fā)出新技術(shù)和方案。對(duì)此我相當(dāng)樂(lè)觀。

馬特•希恩：您指出難以預(yù)料的國(guó)際沖突是對(duì)中國(guó)崛起的最大威脅，然而當(dāng)前的國(guó)際環(huán)境因?yàn)橹袊?guó)的崛起而充滿沖突, 就算中國(guó)成功地打破了對(duì)其不利的現(xiàn)有格局, 但是在大方向上中國(guó)的策略是否是失敗的？

李世默：任何長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)戰(zhàn)略都有其短期目標(biāo)之間的矛盾,受制于這種矛盾才會(huì)失敗。利用和平的外部環(huán)境發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)，是中國(guó)關(guān)鍵的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)。但是，中國(guó)的復(fù)興有其多重使命，其中就包括恢復(fù)在亞太的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位，以保衛(wèi)中國(guó)的核心利益。中國(guó)要實(shí)現(xiàn)復(fù)興不可能不承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，我想中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略不是無(wú)謂的避免風(fēng)險(xiǎn), 而是積極承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn), 穩(wěn)妥控制風(fēng)險(xiǎn), 以實(shí)現(xiàn)利益最大化。

馬特•希恩：您反駁了民眾收入增加會(huì)刺激政治權(quán)利、言論自由之類(lèi)訴求的觀點(diǎn)。且不論政治表達(dá)的問(wèn)題，您如何看如民族主義等中國(guó)民間政治意識(shí)覺(jué)醒的現(xiàn)象？

李世默：只要瀏覽一下中國(guó)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)平臺(tái)，比如微博、YY語(yǔ)音或微信，就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)無(wú)數(shù)民眾每天都在放開(kāi)地表達(dá)自己。然而，認(rèn)為中國(guó)民眾正期待政治權(quán)利，這是自欺欺人的偽命題。

在描述中國(guó)民眾時(shí)，我會(huì)避免用中產(chǎn)階級(jí)這個(gè)詞，因?yàn)檫@一概念的傾向十分明顯。中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的原義是資產(chǎn)階級(jí)，這是歐洲歷史特有的產(chǎn)物。資產(chǎn)階級(jí)的核心特征不只是經(jīng)濟(jì)因素，而是基因中的政治宗教理念。資產(chǎn)階級(jí)的政治宗教基因，可以追溯到歐洲歷史上的新教改革和啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)。新教改革和啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)對(duì)資產(chǎn)階級(jí)的誕生有決定性影響，而經(jīng)濟(jì)因素的影響相對(duì)次要。晚至工業(yè)革命后，資產(chǎn)階級(jí)所取得的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力推動(dòng)了他們奪取政權(quán),從而實(shí)現(xiàn)原有的政治宗教訴求。中國(guó)沒(méi)有什么真正意義上的資產(chǎn)階級(jí)，卻有一個(gè)不斷擴(kuò)大的中等收入群體。相形之下，歐洲的資產(chǎn)階級(jí)天然就有政治、宗教的訴求，這在實(shí)質(zhì)上并不取決于經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況。

認(rèn)為民眾一旦獲得冰箱、汽車(chē)，接著就自然會(huì)要求選票，這種想法十分荒唐，在歷史和政治學(xué)中毫無(wú)根據(jù)。

（翻頁(yè)請(qǐng)看英文原文）

Eric X. Li On Why China Is Winning In The Pacific

Matt Sheehan

（Eric X. Li is a venture capitalist, political scientist and frequent commentator on China's growing economic and military influence. In a provocative TED Talk and several articles he has predicted that while China will continue to grow its wealth and power, it's unlikely to depart from one-party governance or take an evangelical approach to extending its values beyond Chinese borders. While in San Francisco for a conference, Li sat down with The WorldPost's Matt Sheehan for a conversation about China's growing territorial assertiveness, the transforming international order, and the future of China's political system.）

With Obama's recent trip to Japan and the rhetoric on conflicts in places like Ukraine, it seems that the U.S. is attempting to reassure allies that it will be there for them in case of conflict. Do you think these assurances carry much weight after what's happened in Syria and Crimea?

I really don't know. I think that American politicians have a tendency to make promises for the sake of expediency that they can't possibly keep. It's the norm for domestic politics during elections, but it's also increasingly the case in international relations. This reminds me of George Kennan, the great architect of America's containment policy during the Cold War. When NATO was expanding eastward along with the EU after the end of the Cold War, he said it was a grave mistake. The U.S. was just lightheartedly issuing security guarantees to protect many nations that it had no real desire or intent or ability to truly meaningfully fulfill. I think his prediction is becoming reality. Where is George Kennan when you need him?

Has what's happened in places like Crimea changed the calculus of what Chinese leaders think is possible in the Asia Pacific? Has it changed how far they think they can push these conflicts?

I think only on the margin. It's a secondary trend, whether Crimea happens or not. The more decisive trend is occurring in America. I mean, the United States has 4.5 percent of the world's population, less than 20 percent of its production, but accounts for half of the whole world's defense spending. It is constantly at war in distant lands. In a little more than a generation's time after winning the Cold War, it has become deeply in debt, its industry is hollowed out, its middle class is collapsing, its infrastructure is badly in disrepair, its education is under-funded, and its social contract is in shambles. It is not sustainable; it simply can't go on forever. American foreign policy is "pivoting" to Asia, then to the Middle East, then to Ukraine, while the American people badly need a pivot to Ohio. And that is the context within which China seems to be considering its strategic options in the very long term.

When discussing the emerging relationship between the U.S. and China, you've talked about managed competition, strategic cooperation and respect for spheres of influence. In that context, what role does the U.S. have to play in the Asia Pacific?

The United States has protectorates in the Asia Pacific region that are in conflict with China, Japan being the biggest and the Philippines as well. The question is whether we're going toward a future in which China will justifiably be able to establish a legitimate sphere of influence in this neighborhood in an orderly fashion. It's a large country with a long history, and we'll see if it can fulfill its destiny as a pre-eminent power in the Asia Pacific in a peaceful manner and what will the United States' role be in this process. That is the question.

You've argued that the Chinese Communist Party derives its legitimacy from economic progress and the nationalist legitimacy of liberating China after the 'century of humiliation' at the hands of foreign powers. In a potential territorial showdown with Japan, Chinese leaders may have to choose between a military clash that is highly disruptive to the economy, or appearing to give ground on core nationalist interests. If so, how do you see the party choosing to move forward?

In that case, the two sources of legitimacy are in conflict and the Chinese leadership has just got to manage this. This is a delicate balance that they have to get, and I think they've done reasonably well so far. If managed well, in the long term, the two goals are mutually supportive of each other.

I don't buy the argument that China has hurt itself in its more assertive policies in the South and East China Sea. I think they've performed brilliantly. The strategy was to change the status quo in China's favor without leading to actual military conflict, and in territorial disputes with the Philippines and Japan they've done that. For the islands disputed with the Philippines, China now effectively controls the space and there has been no war. In the Diaoyu Islands, China has been able to create new realities on the ground. Japan's long held position has been the denial of dispute. They continue to deny there is a dispute, but dispute is now a fact. China's patrol boats are there frequently. China has changed the status quo qualitatively, and there's been no war.

At the same time, you've described unanticipated military conflict as the greatest threat to China's development. If that's the case, can recent moves that have changed the status quo but also ratcheted up tensions and the likelihood of conflict really be called a success for China?

Success does not come out of being paralyzed by seemingly conflicting objectives. Economic development helped by a peaceful external environment is a critical strategic objective for China, but so is a multifaceted renaissance of the Chinese nation that includes reclaiming a leadership position in the Asia Pacific that would enable China to protect its core interests. These goals cannot be achieved without taking risks. I think the Chinese strategy is to take calculated risks but control risks in order to obtain optimal outcomes.

You argue that the U.S. is no longer able to fill the Leviathan role of policing an international order that it has created. You also say that despite China's ascendancy, it will not try to fill this role of regulating an international architecture. Given China's increasing economic entanglement everywhere from Africa to South America, can China maintain its aloofness on foreign policy issues?

I think certainly China is going to be more internationally involved. It has more outward-looking political and economic policies everywhere from Africa to Southeast Asia. But the fundamental outlook is different. They're not trying to build an overarching system where they're the hegemon. They're trying to do what's best for the Chinese people, and they treat the other participants as independent players. They're not going to try to force their ideas on others or tell others how to run their countries or sign them up to some kind of grand scheme. The Chinese are there to trade and cut the best deals for their own people. Of course they will be more assertive but it's fundamentally different from the American worldview.

You've expressed high confidence in the ability of China's bureaucracy to deal with the many issues that China faces today. Looking at the vast array of challenges, from environmental degradation to corruption to financial and economic hurdles, which issues worry you the most? Are there problems that you think the Chinese Communist Party is not ready or able to handle?

The two front-burner items are economics and corruption. The current economic structure has served China well in the past but will no longer be sustainable in the future, so they're going to need to make structural changes to the economy. But in order to make those structural changes they're going to need to slow down the growth rate, which could cause other problems. So getting that balance right is really hard, I think. But they have a very, very competent team and I think they'll be able to lick it.

The second problem is corruption ... Corruption has been a problem for China for thousands of years; every dynasty has had enormous corruption problems. So the root causes are complex and deep, and it's very difficult to address permanently. Right now the policy is a campaign-style anti-corruption drive: you hit 'em hard and it'll get better for some time and then eventually it will come back and another hit will be required. Right now we're in the early stages of a tough anti-corruption drive, probably the toughest in the history of the People's Republic. I think it'll succeed for some time and it'll contain corruption but won't eliminate it. Other longer-term reforms are also taking place that will see an increasing role of a rule-based institutional system in China's governance, but that is a gradual process.

We're now a year and a half into Xi Jinping's leadership. How do you rate Xi on vision and execution, and what are the real sticking points and toughest nuts to crack?

I characterize the Xi leadership as the beginning of the third 30-year period for the People's Republic, so needless to say I think it's really important. The first 30 years were the Mao era, the second 30 years were the Deng era. In many respects both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were extensions of the Deng era. I think Xi opens a new era that dialectically synthesizes the previous two. In terms of the vision that he has articulated to the Chinese people, where he wants to take the country, and what he's been able to execute in the last 18 months, it has been beyond anyone's imagination or expectations. Economic reforms, anti-corruption, political reforms, everything.

Things have mostly gone well for the Xi leadership so far, but where do the toughest aspects of reform lie?

In my view the biggest risk is an unanticipated international conflict. I think they're going to lick the economics. I know a lot of people are emphasizing the risks, and I agree there are risks but I think they're going to get it right. The economy is moving toward a new phase and it's highly innovative.

I don't know what people are talking about when they say innovation is China's problem. I think China is going through the most innovative period in hundreds of years. When I started as a venture capitalist 18 or 19 years ago, I was told that China could never produce a tech company with a $1 billion market cap. Today Ali Baba and Tencent each are over $100 billion. A $1 billion company? You go into a restaurant in Beijing's university district and there are ten of them.

Many of China's biggest international tech companies are essentially shielded from competition at home. If China wants to produce more companies that compete internationally, say WeChat with WhatsApp, what role (if any) will the Chinese Communist Party play in that?

I think the party's role is not in directly helping these companies. The party's role is more fundamental: attracting people, attracting investment. If you look at universities in China, they are unrecognizable from 10 years ago in terms of the laboratories they've built and the people they've been able to attract. I think they're setting the stage for a sustained period of young talent coming up and being able to create new technologies, new ways of doing things. I'm optimistic on that front.

You've argued against the assumption that with rising incomes will come rising demand for political rights and freedom of expression in China. If this kind of political expression doesn't occur, do you see another kind of political consciousness filling the void, increased nationalism for example?

Just go on any Chinese Internet portal, Weibo, YY, WeChat, for example, and the Chinese people are expressing themselves all day long. I think that this presumption in the West that they'll seek political rights is a pre-supposed problem that didn't exist.

In describing Chinese people, I hesitate to use the term middle class because it's a loaded term. Middle class means bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie was a unique European phenomenon. The bourgeoisie was more than money, the bourgeoisie already had politics and religion in its DNA before their economic success. Money enabled them to act on those aspirations. It goes back to the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment. The bourgeoisie emerged with political and religious elements in its DNA and economics was part of it. China does not have a bourgeois class, it has a middle-income group that is rapidly expanding. In contrast, the European bourgeois class wanted political and religious rights to begin with, with or without money.

The idea that people start buying refrigerators and cars, and then the next thing is they want elections, that's crazy. It has no basis in history or political science; it's made up.

（This interview has been edited for length and clarity.）