大多數(shù)國際關系專家傾向于認為，烏克蘭局勢的發(fā)展正令中國陷入某種窘境。普遍認為，美國高調重返亞太，其用意是遏制中國崛起，因此俄羅斯對中國的戰(zhàn)略意義愈發(fā)凸顯。然而，俄羅斯最近在烏克蘭積極出手，完成對克里米亞的合并，這一連串的動作似乎違反中國的一貫立場。眾所周知，中國一直堅持在國際事務中互不干涉內政的原則。克里米亞的獨立公投對中國來說更是敏感，因為中國也在與臺灣和西藏的分裂勢力進行斗爭。這些專家強調，正是由于擔心作繭自縛，中國對烏克蘭局勢的公開表態(tài)流于模棱兩可。然而，這些高論誤讀了中國的決策。恰恰相反，中國的現(xiàn)行策略是高超的，既具有戰(zhàn)略遠見，也保持了戰(zhàn)術靈活。中國的立場權衡了多種因素，體現(xiàn)了對國際關系大局和烏克蘭特殊形勢細微和深度的理解。

中國的官方立場是十分巧妙的。中國政府重申了互不干涉內政的原則，呼吁尊重烏克蘭的領土完整。與此同時，中國政府強調必須關注烏克蘭歷史問題和當前局勢的復雜性。從現(xiàn)實主義外交的層面分析，中國無疑是在保持中立的前提下，對俄羅斯予以默契支持，同時也避免與西方明顯對立。因此，當美國要求聯(lián)合國安理會譴責俄羅斯時，盡管已遭俄羅斯否決，中國仍然投了棄權票。這一策略符合中國長期的地緣政治利益。

本文英文版發(fā)表于《南華早報》、赫芬頓《世界郵報》等，圖為《世界郵報》評論頭版頭條截圖

中國一直致力于推動國際秩序朝多極化方向發(fā)展。在這一戰(zhàn)略目標下，中國抵制美國的單邊霸權，并努力在亞太地區(qū)重建其大國影響力。蘇聯(lián)解體后俄羅斯經歷了20年的低谷，近年來國力逐漸復蘇，并重新以大國姿態(tài)出現(xiàn)在世界舞臺上，這一趨勢有利于世界的多極化。美國對全球事務的支配能力，相對正每況愈下。“重返亞太”的高調宣示，結果證明是雷聲大雨點小。畢竟明擺的事實是，一次出手只能有一個目標。在烏克蘭危機之前，中東問題已使美國進退維谷，現(xiàn)在與俄羅斯摩擦更令美國被迫再一次轉移目標。這個超級大國忙于四處滅火，對中國無疑是戰(zhàn)略機遇期。

從中國的視角看，也很難輕易斷言俄羅斯的舉動就一定與中國互不干涉內政的原則相悖。其中牽涉的歷史和現(xiàn)實問題，都相當復雜。蘇聯(lián)在一夜之間轟然倒地，世界格局因之失衡，在孕育國際新秩序的過程中，紛爭四起，而西方陣營占據(jù)壓倒性優(yōu)勢，攫取了巨額紅利。不應忽視，俄羅斯以及其他前蘇聯(lián)加盟共和國的民眾，在冷戰(zhàn)的余波中受創(chuàng)尤甚。在這種歷史環(huán)境中草草劃定的邊境，其合法性值得三思，克里米亞就是其中一例。中國人也注意到，西方的積極干預是烏克蘭變局的關鍵推手。美國、歐洲的高級官員不惜親自出馬，到基輔獨立廣場為反對派公開站臺。一段流出的電話錄音揭示，早在亞努科維奇倒臺前，美國助理國務卿紐蘭就已著手籌劃換馬。在烏克蘭危機中，各方其實都沒有袖手旁觀。

一旦西方開始制裁俄羅斯，兩者之間的緊張關系反過來會促使俄向中靠攏。中俄關系的戰(zhàn)略意義體現(xiàn)在三大領域：能源安全，中國在亞太的戰(zhàn)略目的，以及中國在中亞的長期利益。如果遭遇西方的嚴厲制裁，俄羅斯必將進一步靠攏中國，這將有利于在各領域促進中國的戰(zhàn)略利益。中國或能以更優(yōu)惠的條件從俄羅斯購進天然氣，并促使后者調整輸氣管道建設計劃，以適應中國的需求。俄羅斯在亞太的動作，尤其是在對日關系上，可能更多考慮中國的立場。在貫穿中亞的新“絲綢之路”戰(zhàn)略中，俄羅斯能為中國開放更多空間。

長期來看，中國的戰(zhàn)略目標是和平崛起。為了實現(xiàn)和平崛起，中國必須探索出一種新的地緣政治范式。因此在加州峰會上，習近平主席向奧巴馬總統(tǒng)提議在中美兩國間建立新型大國關系。大國之大，不僅在于領土、經濟規(guī)模，關鍵在于其文明擁有的全方位影響區(qū)域。在中國的視角看，只有大國間有效合作、有序競爭，才能保證全球新秩序的和平建立。當然，在中國的定位中，中國、美國和俄羅斯都是大國。在新型大國關系的框架下，大國之間應尊重各自的核心利益和影響區(qū)域。事實上，中國在亞太地區(qū)正開始奉行某種門羅主義。同樣可以肯定，中國的決策者認為烏克蘭無疑是在俄羅斯的影響區(qū)域之內。對西方來說，烏克蘭其實是鞭長莫及的邊緣利益，但西方在烏克蘭的所作所為，極大傷害了俄羅斯的核心利益。在這個意義上，中國對俄羅斯的謹慎支持，恰好反映了中國長期的外交戰(zhàn)略。

毋庸置疑，在烏克蘭問題上，中國既要堅持上述戰(zhàn)略，也要保持戰(zhàn)術靈活和隨機應變。盡管烏克蘭問題牽涉很廣，變數(shù)甚多，但目前來看，只要不出現(xiàn)重大失誤，中國幾乎不可能走錯棋?？死锩讈喌莫毩⒐度绫恢袊J，臺灣或西藏的分裂勢力難道真的會認為他們能效尤？答案無疑是否定的。中國能否恪守官方中立，有效避免與西方對立？根據(jù)歷史判斷，答案是肯定的。

（李世默是上海的風險投資家和政治學者，復旦大學中國發(fā)展模式研究中心的高級研究員。此文由觀察者網guancha.cn 匯編供稿，發(fā)表于《南華早報》和《世界郵報》等。翻頁查看英文全文。）

CHINA’S UKRAINIAN OPPORTUNITY -- KILLING A FEW BIRDS WITHOUT THROWING A SINGLE STONE

By:  Eric X. Li

SHANGHAI – Most international relations experts seem to believe that the development in Ukraine has put China into an uncomfortable dilemma.  With America’s pivot to the Asia Pacific - largely seen as a move to check rising Chinese power – Russia has grown in strategic importance to China.  However, Russia’s actions in Ukraine and its absorption of Crimea seem contravene China’s long held principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.  The secession referendum in Crimea carries sensitive implications for China as it deals with its own separatist issues in Taiwan and Tibet.  China’s equivocal public pronouncements on Ukraine are cited as proof that it is finding itself in a bind.  But this is a misreading of China’s behavior.  On the contrary, China is exploiting the situation with strategic foresight and tactical agility.  China’s reaction is also consistent with its nuanced understanding of international relations in general and the Ukrainian crisis in particular.

China’s official position has been subtle.  It asserts the principle of non-interference and respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  On the other hand, it puts emphasis on recognizing the complexity of both the historic conditions and the current state of affairs in Ukraine.  It should be fairly clear to any foreign policy realists that China’s approach is maintaining formal neutrality while providing tacit support to Russia without causing an adversarial rift with the Western alliance.  Even with a Russian veto, China still chose to abstain from the recent United Nations Security Council vote on U.S. proposed resolution condemning Russia.   This strategy is consistent with China’s long-term geo-political interests.

One of China’s over-riding strategic objectives is to foster the development of a multi-polar world in which American hegemony is checked and China gradually gains the space to reclaim its leadership role in the Asia Pacific.  Russia’s reemergence as a great power 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union is conducive to this objective.  America’s dominance in global affairs is indeed receding on a relative basis.  Its much-touted “pivot to Asia” says as much.  After all, by definition, one can only pivot to one place at a time.  Even before Ukraine, America’s pivot already seemed to be redirecting back towards the Middle East.  Now no doubt it has to pivot to Russia.  A continuously swirling pivot by the super power serves China’s interests. 

From the Chinese perspective, whether Russia’s actions contradict China’s principle of non-interference may not be such an open and shut case.  This is where the recognition of complexity comes in.  The collapse of the Soviet Union happened suddenly.  The rearrangement of the world order that followed was chaotic and carried out under an imbalance of power overwhelmingly in favor of the Western alliance.  It is a historic fact that the peoples of Russia and many former Soviet republics suffered immeasurably in the aftermath of the Cold War.  The legitimacy of borders settled under such circumstances can be debatable.  And Crimea is a case in point.  The Chinese may also have seen that the overthrow of the Ukrainian government was caused in no small part by active Western interference.  Senior American and European officials were conspicuously present on the Maidan.  One leading American diplomat was recorded in a telephone discussion to be plotting out who should replace president Yanukovych before his overthrow.   So at the very least interference was carried out by both sides. 

The second aspect of the worsening conflict between Russia and the West has to do with the important relationship between Russia and China.  Russia’s strategic importance to China covers three dimensions: energy supply, China’s strategic objectives in the Asia Pacific, and China’s long-term interests in Central Asia.  A Russia under severe sanctions by a hostile Western alliance would be more reliant on China.  In return, Chinese interests would be better served in all three arenas.  Russia’s supply of natural gas to China would be on better terms and pipelines could be built in manners more favorable to Chinese interests.  Russia’s role in the Asia Pacific, especially vis-à-vis Japan, could be steered more towards China’s preferences.  More space may be afforded the Chinese in their strategic push to develop a new “silk road” through Central Asia. 

In the very long term, China wants its rise to be peaceful.  And a new geo-political paradigm is required to facilitate such a peaceful rise.  It is what Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed to U.S. president Barack Obama during their summit in California called a new formula of da-guo relations.   A da-guo is a major nation state with a civilizational sphere of influence.  In China’s view, only effective cooperation and prudential management of competition among the da-guo’s can ensure the peaceful emergence of a new global order.  Of course, China sees itself as a da-guo.  The U.S. and Russia are surely on that list as well.  According to this new da-guo relations doctrine, core interests and spheres of influence are to be respected.  China is indeed gradually asserting its own Monroe doctrine in the Asia Pacific.  It is a near certainty that Chinese policy makers would consider Ukraine to be within Russia’s sphere of influence.  Ukraine is at best of peripheral interests to the West, yet actions taken by the West have seriously harmed Russia’s core interests.  In that respect, China’s subtle support for Russia is consistent with its long-term foreign policy grand strategy. 

No doubt, tactical agility and some deft maneuvering by Chinese would be required to carry out this strategy with regards to Ukraine.  There are also many unpredictable forces that are shaping events.  But at present, short of a major blunder, the downside for China is minimal.  Would anyone in Taiwan or Tibet seriously think China’s acquiescence to a Crimean separation referendum would mean they could get away with one too?  Probably not.  Can the Chinese walk a tight rope on formal neutrality as not to trigger a confrontation with the West?  Their track record would indicate a yes. 

（Eric X. Li is a venture capitalist and political scientist in Shanghai.  He is a senior fellow at Fudan University’s Center for Chinese Development Model Research.  This article was published in the South China Morning Post.  The Chinese original is published by Guancha.cn and distributed by the Guancha Syndicate. ）

《南華早報》鏈接：http://www.scmp.com/comment/article/1452507/nothing-awkward-about-chinas-position-regard-ukraine 

赫芬頓《世界郵報》鏈接：http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-x-li/chinas-ukrainian-opportunity_b_4997075.html?utm_hp_ref=world