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2012年11月，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨召開(kāi)了第十八次全國(guó)代表大會(huì)。在這次大會(huì)上，中共順利完成了十年一次的最高權(quán)力交接，新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體登上政治舞臺(tái)。一切正如預(yù)期，習(xí)近平接任中共中央總書(shū)記，并將在2013年3月出任中華人民共和國(guó)國(guó)家主席。

事實(shí)證明，這個(gè)自信的、崛起的大國(guó)的最高權(quán)力交接是平穩(wěn)、周密且有序的。但國(guó)際媒體甚至一些中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的知識(shí)分子仍罔顧事實(shí)，繼續(xù)把中國(guó)描繪成正處于“危急關(guān)頭”。比如，在十八大開(kāi)幕前夕出版的一期《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》周刊，就匿名引用了某些學(xué)者在近期一次會(huì)議上的發(fā)言。這些學(xué)者聲稱(chēng)，中國(guó)的政治現(xiàn)狀是“底層失穩(wěn)、中層失落、上層失控”。

確實(shí)，在進(jìn)行政權(quán)交接之前數(shù)月，薄熙來(lái)事件對(duì)中共形象造成巨大沖擊。繼1989年春夏之交的廣場(chǎng)政治風(fēng)波后，中共最高層的緊密團(tuán)結(jié)一直是中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)政治穩(wěn)定的中流砥柱。而薄事件使中共長(zhǎng)期維護(hù)的團(tuán)結(jié)一致的形象受到質(zhì)疑。

雪上加霜的是，連續(xù)20多年保持GDP兩位數(shù)增速的中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)，在這關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻放緩了腳步，連續(xù)七個(gè)季度增長(zhǎng)乏力。中國(guó)此前一直依靠發(fā)展勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)、政府大規(guī)模投資基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施以及擴(kuò)大出口等舉措，推動(dòng)快速工業(yè)化的發(fā)展模式似乎已遭遇瓶頸。國(guó)內(nèi)外某些人甚至斷言，如果中國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人無(wú)法繼續(xù)創(chuàng)造經(jīng)濟(jì)奇跡，中共的執(zhí)政地位將會(huì)動(dòng)搖，一黨執(zhí)政的中國(guó)將走向崩潰。

刊登本文的《外交事務(wù)》雜志封面

然而，這些悲觀預(yù)言者將再一次被證明，他們的水平可能與堅(jiān)信2012年12月21日是世界末日的人差不多。毋庸置疑，中國(guó)的新任領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人習(xí)近平未來(lái)的執(zhí)政道路充滿(mǎn)嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn)。但據(jù)此唱衰中共政權(quán)，認(rèn)為中共無(wú)法應(yīng)對(duì)未來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn)，則是大大地誤判了中國(guó)的政治形勢(shì)，低估了中共執(zhí)政體制的韌性。中共適應(yīng)時(shí)勢(shì)的能力、選賢任能的體制、深植于民心的政權(quán)合法性，將使其能靈活、高效地應(yīng)對(duì)中國(guó)的各種問(wèn)題。

可以預(yù)見(jiàn)，未來(lái)十年中國(guó)不僅不會(huì)崩潰，還會(huì)像神州大地上奔馳的高鐵一樣繼續(xù)快速前進(jìn)。中國(guó)的新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將不斷鞏固和完善一黨執(zhí)政的政治模式。這一歷史進(jìn)程，將挑戰(zhàn)西方世界的傳統(tǒng)政治理念，即認(rèn)為政治進(jìn)步的終極目標(biāo)是實(shí)行多黨選舉式民主。在這文明古國(guó)的政治中心北京，世界也許將見(jiàn)證后民主時(shí)代的到來(lái)。

上下求索

有些人斷言，一黨制天生缺乏自我糾錯(cuò)能力。但歷史實(shí)踐卻證明這一斷言過(guò)于自信。從1949年新中國(guó)成立以來(lái)，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨已連續(xù)執(zhí)政63年，在其跌宕起伏的執(zhí)政歷程中，表現(xiàn)出了超凡的適應(yīng)性和自我糾錯(cuò)能力。上世紀(jì)50年代初，中共發(fā)動(dòng)了激進(jìn)的土改；50年代末，又發(fā)起了“大躍進(jìn)”運(yùn)動(dòng)；從60年代后期到70年代中期， “文化大革命”席卷全國(guó)。但令人難以置信的是，同樣是這個(gè)黨，早在60年代初就開(kāi)始試行土地準(zhǔn)私有化；70年代末，鄧小平啟動(dòng)了市場(chǎng)化改革；到90年代，江澤民通過(guò)“三個(gè)代表”理論對(duì)黨重新定位，主動(dòng)吸納新社會(huì)階層人士入黨，等等。實(shí)際上，中共從建黨到1949年前的革命征途中和建國(guó)后的治國(guó)道路上，曾屢次因嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)誤而使自身陷入困境，或把國(guó)家和民族帶入歧途，但它每次都依靠其自身機(jī)制，而不是其他任何外部力量，一再改錯(cuò)糾偏、撥亂反正。其中最著名也是最成功的例子就是鄧小平推行的以經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)為中心和改革開(kāi)放，這一巨大調(diào)整使中國(guó)在短短32年間一躍而為世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

在政治體制上，中共近三十多年來(lái)推動(dòng)了許多大刀闊斧的改革。在上世紀(jì)八九十年代，中共廢除了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)干部終身制，改行任期制，并明確年齡限制，比如要求政治局常委當(dāng)選時(shí)原則上不超過(guò)68歲。此前，由于政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人實(shí)際上是終身任職，很容易出現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)期在位而引發(fā)的大權(quán)獨(dú)攬、不受制約等問(wèn)題。毛澤東可謂典型例子，他結(jié)束了中國(guó)肆虐的戰(zhàn)亂，趕走了外國(guó)侵略者，是現(xiàn)代中國(guó)名副其實(shí)的締造者，但也正是這個(gè)偉大的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，在長(zhǎng)期執(zhí)政的后期，直接發(fā)動(dòng)了“文化大革命”等浩劫。任期制的確立，確保中共避免再犯最頂層的少數(shù)人長(zhǎng)期壟斷政治權(quán)力的錯(cuò)誤，并為隨后建立促進(jìn)人才向上自由平等流動(dòng)的機(jī)制奠定基礎(chǔ)。

在外交政策上，為實(shí)現(xiàn)中華民族的復(fù)興，中國(guó)同樣做出了多次重大調(diào)整。上世紀(jì)50年代，中國(guó)一度實(shí)行向蘇聯(lián)“一邊倒”的政策；70年代到80年代，中國(guó)卻采取了事實(shí)上與美國(guó)結(jié)盟以遏制蘇聯(lián)的策略。新世紀(jì)以來(lái)，中國(guó)所堅(jiān)持的獨(dú)立自主的外交方針，頻頻引發(fā)了與美國(guó)的摩擦甚至沖突?，F(xiàn)在，中國(guó)審時(shí)度勢(shì)，清醒地吸取他國(guó)歷史教訓(xùn)， 又提出 “走和平發(fā)展道路”，以免重蹈德國(guó)和日本20世紀(jì)上半葉窮兵黷武的覆轍，努力實(shí)現(xiàn)一個(gè)和平的崛起。

在中國(guó)經(jīng)歷十年一次的政治交接時(shí)，國(guó)內(nèi)外呼吁啟動(dòng)新一輪政治改革的呼聲日漸高漲。其中最激進(jìn)者催促中國(guó)開(kāi)放多黨選舉，或至少使黨內(nèi)派系競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合法化。這些呼吁者認(rèn)為，只有通過(guò)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性選舉，中共才能取得其繼續(xù)執(zhí)政所需的合法性。但這些呼聲忽視了一個(gè)最基本的事實(shí)：中共一直在進(jìn)行政治改革，堪稱(chēng)是世界近代史上最具自我革新勇氣和能力的政治組織。當(dāng)然，與2002年胡錦濤出任總書(shū)記時(shí)相比，中國(guó)今天的新一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體面對(duì)的將是全新的世界格局，但中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨很可能在習(xí)近平總書(shū)記的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，再次通過(guò)自我革新，主動(dòng)適應(yīng)新的形勢(shì)，有效應(yīng)對(duì)高速變化的國(guó)內(nèi)外環(huán)境所帶來(lái)的新挑戰(zhàn)。這一過(guò)程中，中共通過(guò)自身高效靈活的選賢任能體制，不斷選拔任用優(yōu)秀干練的干部充實(shí)到政府中去，是其制勝的一大法寶。

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能者居上

西方所謂的“中國(guó)通”們反復(fù)強(qiáng)調(diào)中國(guó)的干部腐敗問(wèn)題，用薄熙來(lái)事件等極端情況傳播聳人聽(tīng)聞的故事，并以此為據(jù)宣稱(chēng)中共及其體制已病入膏肓。確實(shí)，中共的體制存在著種種弊端，但解鈴還須系鈴人，這些弊病必須通過(guò)中共自己從內(nèi)部根治。西方人士或許無(wú)法相信，中共作為一個(gè)享有中國(guó)憲法確認(rèn)并保護(hù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的執(zhí)政黨，其內(nèi)部的選賢任能競(jìng)爭(zhēng)之激烈程度，能夠超過(guò)世界上所有的政治組織。

在十八大換屆前，中共的最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)--中央政治局共有25名委員，其中只有5人出身背景優(yōu)越，也就是所謂的“太子黨”。其余20人，包括國(guó)家主席胡錦濤和政府總理溫家寶，都是平民出身。再看由300多人組成的十七屆中央委員會(huì)，出身顯赫者的比例更低。據(jù)此可以說(shuō)，絕大多數(shù)中共高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都是靠自身努力和激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)獲得晉升的。毋庸諱言，新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人習(xí)近平的父親是中共元老，但他也同樣經(jīng)歷了長(zhǎng)期的基層歷練，十八大當(dāng)選出的新一屆高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，絕大多數(shù)都是基層起家的。

中共如何從制度上保證選賢任能呢？關(guān)鍵之一是有一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的組織機(jī)構(gòu)，即中央組織部。對(duì)此西方鮮有人知。中央組織部主持制定了一整套完善的機(jī)制，通過(guò)復(fù)雜精細(xì)的程序進(jìn)行干部遴選和評(píng)估，不斷選拔出優(yōu)秀的人才。這套機(jī)制的效力，恐怕最成功的商業(yè)公司都會(huì)自嘆弗如。任人唯親的現(xiàn)象確實(shí)存在，但總體上看，才干和政績(jī)是決定晉升的主要標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

政府以及相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)一年一度地從大學(xué)畢業(yè)生中招錄人員，被錄取者的去向分三類(lèi)：即政府職能部門(mén)、國(guó)有企業(yè)，以及政府管轄的事業(yè)單位，如大學(xué)、社區(qū)組織等。大部分新人會(huì)從最低一級(jí)的科員干起，經(jīng)過(guò)幾年的工作積累后，組織部門(mén)會(huì)根據(jù)其表現(xiàn)，決定是否將其提升到更高的管理職位上，比如副科、科、副處、處。這一區(qū)間的職位包羅萬(wàn)象，既包括負(fù)責(zé)貧困農(nóng)村的衛(wèi)生工作，也包括負(fù)責(zé)城區(qū)里的招商引資工作。各級(jí)干部每年都要接受組織部門(mén)的考察，其中包括績(jī)效定量考核，征求上級(jí)、下級(jí)和同事的反饋意見(jiàn)，以及個(gè)人操守審查。此外，有關(guān)部門(mén)還頻繁廣泛地進(jìn)行民意調(diào)查，內(nèi)容既涉及對(duì)國(guó)家整體方向的滿(mǎn)意度，也包括對(duì)各地具體政策的意見(jiàn)建議。在完成對(duì)候選人的全部考察后，有關(guān)部門(mén)還會(huì)公開(kāi)征求公眾意見(jiàn)，最后由組織部門(mén)匯總整理成詳盡的考察材料，報(bào)送上級(jí)黨委，由黨委召開(kāi)集體會(huì)議并慎重討論后，確定提升人選。

完成最初的晉升后，公務(wù)人員的發(fā)展方向面臨多種選擇。中共的干部可以在政府職能部門(mén)、國(guó)有企業(yè)，以及社會(huì)事業(yè)單位等三大領(lǐng)域內(nèi)輪轉(zhuǎn)任職。具體來(lái)說(shuō)，一位干部可能從經(jīng)濟(jì)管理工作調(diào)任政治或社會(huì)治理工作，也可能從傳統(tǒng)意義上的政府機(jī)構(gòu)調(diào)任國(guó)有企業(yè)或大學(xué)的管理職位。組織部門(mén)常常派送大批年輕有為的干部出國(guó)進(jìn)修，了解世界各地的先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，比如他們會(huì)定期組織一些人到哈佛大學(xué)肯尼迪政府學(xué)院和新加坡國(guó)立大學(xué)等機(jī)構(gòu)培訓(xùn)。

公務(wù)員們經(jīng)歷長(zhǎng)期的基層工作鍛煉并不斷積累實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)后，佼佼者有望再次晉升，成為副局和正局級(jí)干部。這一級(jí)別的干部，有可能領(lǐng)導(dǎo)數(shù)百萬(wàn)人口的城區(qū)，也有可能管理年?duì)I業(yè)收入數(shù)億美元的國(guó)有企業(yè)。因此，對(duì)局級(jí)干部的選拔更為嚴(yán)格。從統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)看，2012年，中國(guó)科級(jí)與副科級(jí)干部約為90萬(wàn)人，處級(jí)與副處級(jí)干部約為60萬(wàn)人，而局級(jí)與副局級(jí)干部?jī)H為4萬(wàn)人。

在局級(jí)干部中，只有最為出眾的極少數(shù)人才有機(jī)會(huì)繼續(xù)晉升，最終進(jìn)入中共中央委員會(huì)。在一位干部的職業(yè)生涯中，從積累基層經(jīng)驗(yàn)開(kāi)始，到進(jìn)入高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)序列，期間一般要經(jīng)過(guò)二三十年的工作歷練。因此幾乎所有高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，都有在中國(guó)社會(huì)各大領(lǐng)域主持工作的豐富管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)。僅就十七屆中央政治局而言，25人中就有19人兼有領(lǐng)導(dǎo)省、部工作的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。值得一提的是，作為地方政府的省，在幅員上要超過(guò)世界上大多數(shù)國(guó)家；作為中央部門(mén)的部，在預(yù)算上要超過(guò)一般國(guó)家的整個(gè)政府。事實(shí)上，具有上千年歷史的帝國(guó)官僚體系是中國(guó)的政治中堅(jiān)和文化傳統(tǒng)，今天中共的組織部門(mén)創(chuàng)造性地繼承了這一獨(dú)特的歷史遺產(chǎn)，并制定了現(xiàn)代化的制度以培養(yǎng)當(dāng)代中國(guó)的政治精英。如果要論政府管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)，巴拉克?奧巴馬第一次問(wèn)鼎美國(guó)總統(tǒng)時(shí)，其資歷可能還比不上中國(guó)一個(gè)縣的負(fù)責(zé)人。

習(xí)近平的履歷就是非常鮮明的例證。在過(guò)去的大約30年間，習(xí)近平從貧困地區(qū)相當(dāng)于副科的村干部做起，跨過(guò)一個(gè)又一個(gè)臺(tái)階，一直做到政治局委員兼上海市委書(shū)記。在他成為中央領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之前，他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)過(guò)的地區(qū)總?cè)丝诶塾?jì)已超過(guò)1.5億，創(chuàng)造的GDP合計(jì)超過(guò)1.5萬(wàn)億美元。習(xí)近平是這一代高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的縮影，他的政治生涯充分證明了選賢任能體制是當(dāng)代中國(guó)政治的巨大驅(qū)動(dòng)力，所有位高權(quán)重者無(wú)不一步一個(gè)腳印，履歷扎實(shí)豐富。

革故鼎新

中國(guó)集中化的選賢任能政治模式，還能激發(fā)政府的創(chuàng)新精神。中央政府的頂層設(shè)計(jì)經(jīng)過(guò)地方的小規(guī)模試點(diǎn)驗(yàn)證后，再總結(jié)經(jīng)驗(yàn)全國(guó)推廣，這一模式的成功例證不勝枚舉。其中最著名的，莫過(guò)于鄧小平在80年代設(shè)立“經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)”的創(chuàng)舉。在中國(guó)最早的經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)深圳，政府放開(kāi)計(jì)劃指令，按照市場(chǎng)原則搞活經(jīng)濟(jì)。深圳經(jīng)濟(jì)迅速騰飛，中央政府立即總結(jié)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，并把經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)的政策擴(kuò)大推廣到廣東省珠海市、汕頭市、福建省廈門(mén)市、上海浦東以及海南省的眾多地區(qū)。

30多年來(lái)，全國(guó)各地成千上萬(wàn)的制度試驗(yàn)不斷生根發(fā)芽，從下至上地推動(dòng)著中國(guó)的改革。選賢任能的激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激發(fā)地方干部中的佼佼者勇于探索，期望通過(guò)政績(jī)脫穎而出。在出席十八大的2326名代表中，中國(guó)西南偏遠(yuǎn)省份云南省委副書(shū)記仇和頗為引人注目。在剛結(jié)束的十八大上，仇和當(dāng)選中央候補(bǔ)委員，這意味著這位55歲的“個(gè)性”干部正式步入中共高層。仇和的履歷，是中國(guó)政治改革者成長(zhǎng)的一個(gè)縮影。仇和出生于貧窮的農(nóng)民家庭，八個(gè)兄弟姐妹中，曾有兩個(gè)弟弟因?yàn)闋I(yíng)養(yǎng)不良和疾病夭折?！拔母铩苯Y(jié)束后，中國(guó)恢復(fù)高考，仇和經(jīng)由這一改變命運(yùn)的階梯，考入大學(xué)。參加工作后，仇和先是在政府部門(mén)基層歷練，于上世紀(jì)90年代起任職江蘇省沭陽(yáng)縣縣委書(shū)記。其時(shí)沭陽(yáng)縣是全國(guó)最貧窮的縣之一，幾乎沒(méi)有像樣的工業(yè)企業(yè)，全縣人口多達(dá)170萬(wàn)，但人均年GDP僅有250美元，不及全國(guó)平均水平的五分之一。當(dāng)時(shí)的沭陽(yáng)縣可謂一窮二白，且犯罪高發(fā)、腐敗肆虐。

仇和新官上任就連燒幾把火，果斷實(shí)行大量實(shí)驗(yàn)性政策，在當(dāng)?shù)匾鹁薮鬆?zhēng)議。當(dāng)時(shí)的情況下，如果實(shí)驗(yàn)失敗，仇和的政治生命也必將夭折。他的第一把火，燒向了沭陽(yáng)長(zhǎng)期滯后的經(jīng)濟(jì)。1997年，仇和推出了市政建設(shè)債券強(qiáng)制購(gòu)買(mǎi)計(jì)劃，要求沭陽(yáng)縣民眾購(gòu)買(mǎi)建設(shè)債券，以支持急需的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)（據(jù)公開(kāi)報(bào)道，仇和規(guī)定，每個(gè)財(cái)政供養(yǎng)人員扣除工資總額10％，每個(gè)農(nóng)民出8個(gè)義務(wù)工，組成修路隊(duì)，在高峰時(shí)，扣款達(dá)到20％，甚至離退休人員的工資，也被扣除10％用作交通建設(shè)。）這一舉措后來(lái)證明是一箭雙雕。首先，仇和作為縣委書(shū)記根本無(wú)權(quán)開(kāi)征新稅，因此無(wú)法通過(guò)增稅募集建設(shè)資金；其次，建設(shè)債券為沭陽(yáng)縣民眾提供了投資機(jī)會(huì)，債券持有人后來(lái)都收回了本息，這就比純粹增稅更勝一籌。此外，仇和要求縣政府所有干部都必須完成一定數(shù)額的招商引資指標(biāo)。為了吸引投資，政府一方面大規(guī)模投資該地區(qū)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，另一方面為投資者提供稅收和土地出讓優(yōu)惠。短短幾年間，數(shù)千家私營(yíng)企業(yè)蜂擁而來(lái)，沭陽(yáng)縣從該地區(qū)長(zhǎng)期的貧窮落后分子，一舉成為生機(jī)勃勃的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)頭羊。

仇和的第二把火燒向猖獗的腐敗和持續(xù)惡化的干群關(guān)系。90年代晚期，仇和推出兩項(xiàng)開(kāi)創(chuàng)性舉措，提高干部選拔的透明度和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性。其一是推行干部任前公示制，以廣泛征求意見(jiàn)。其二是引入村干部選舉“兩票制”，即先由村民在本村黨員中票選出若干名村干部候選人，再由黨委在票數(shù)最多的兩人中選出最終人選。

仇和的試驗(yàn)最初遭到當(dāng)?shù)馗刹亢兔癖姷膹?qiáng)烈抵制，但他冒著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)堅(jiān)決推進(jìn)，終于成功地把沭陽(yáng)這個(gè)當(dāng)年全國(guó)著名的貧困縣帶領(lǐng)成為江蘇省的工商業(yè)先進(jìn)縣，并率先開(kāi)啟城鎮(zhèn)化進(jìn)程，吸引全國(guó)不少貧困縣前來(lái)學(xué)習(xí)取經(jīng)。他倡導(dǎo)的干部任前公示制在全國(guó)廣為推行，村級(jí)干部的差額選舉方式也已被引入更高層的黨組織選舉中。仇和本人的政治生涯也更上層樓，先后出任江蘇省副省長(zhǎng)、昆明市委書(shū)記、云南省委副書(shū)記，并在十八大上當(dāng)選中央候補(bǔ)委員。

某些批評(píng)者即使不得不承認(rèn)中共具備自我改革能力，并且能做到選賢任能，他們依然堅(jiān)持質(zhì)疑這個(gè)政權(quán)的合法性。西方預(yù)設(shè)了一個(gè)假定的前提：政權(quán)合法性的唯一來(lái)源，就是多黨競(jìng)爭(zhēng)選舉。依據(jù)這一假設(shè)，由于中國(guó)沒(méi)有多黨制選舉，中共的政權(quán)自然就是無(wú)本之木。中共的批評(píng)者還進(jìn)而沿著這一邏輯，多年來(lái)不斷預(yù)言這個(gè)政權(quán)行將崩潰，幾十年已經(jīng)過(guò)去了，中國(guó)的發(fā)展和中共的壯大一再證明著這個(gè)預(yù)言的荒誕。近幾年來(lái)，上述預(yù)言又改頭換面，聲稱(chēng)中共之所以還能維持統(tǒng)治，僅僅是因?yàn)樽罱嗄曛袊?guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)一直保持著高速增長(zhǎng)，即中共政權(quán)憑借“政績(jī)”來(lái)維系著合法性。

坦率地說(shuō)，驕人政績(jī)的確是中共合法性的一大來(lái)源。據(jù)2011年美國(guó)皮尤研究中心在中國(guó)進(jìn)行的民意調(diào)查顯示， 高達(dá)87%的中國(guó)民眾對(duì)國(guó)家的未來(lái)方向表示滿(mǎn)意； 66%的民眾認(rèn)為過(guò)去五年中生活水平顯著提高；74%的民眾相信未來(lái)五年生活會(huì)繼續(xù)改善。不過(guò)，“政績(jī)”只是中共獲得民眾支持的原因之一，中共執(zhí)政合法性的真正根基和內(nèi)核，還須追溯到中國(guó)的民族主義和更為根本性的道德合法性。

1949年中華人民共和國(guó)成立時(shí)，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨在天安門(mén)廣場(chǎng)樹(shù)立了人民英雄紀(jì)念碑。紀(jì)念碑以一組浮雕展示了中國(guó)人民在近現(xiàn)代歷史上頑強(qiáng)拼搏，最終建立中華人民共和國(guó)的歷程。按照常理推測(cè)，既然中共是一個(gè)馬克思列寧主義的政黨，那么紀(jì)念碑的浮雕主題自然應(yīng)該首先強(qiáng)調(diào)共產(chǎn)主義的意識(shí)形態(tài)，諸如馬克思創(chuàng)作的《共產(chǎn)黨宣言》，或者1921年中共建黨。但事實(shí)并非如此，浮雕的開(kāi)篇主題是1839年的“虎門(mén)銷(xiāo)煙”，當(dāng)時(shí)清朝的欽差大臣林則徐公開(kāi)焚毀了沒(méi)收來(lái)的英商走私鴉片，英國(guó)借機(jī)對(duì)華開(kāi)戰(zhàn)，史稱(chēng)“第一次鴉片戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”。中國(guó)戰(zhàn)敗，向英國(guó)割地賠款求和，中華民族從此陷入“百年國(guó)恥”。在之后的一百多年間，中國(guó)遭受了無(wú)數(shù)次入侵、戰(zhàn)亂和饑荒，直到1949年新中國(guó)成立，才迎來(lái)眾所周知的歷史性轉(zhuǎn)折。一直到今天，人民英雄紀(jì)念碑依舊是中國(guó)最神圣的公共地標(biāo)，充分彰顯著中共建國(guó)的道德權(quán)威。

中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨不僅是新中國(guó)的締造者，同時(shí)也是中國(guó)現(xiàn)代化的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。自從1935年遵義會(huì)議上確立了毛澤東的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位之后，中共的宗旨就一直是復(fù)興中華民族，而不是向世界輸出共產(chǎn)主義革命。以此為起點(diǎn)，中共吸納了馬克思主義，逐漸形成了中國(guó)化的社會(huì)主義。這種社會(huì)主義不同于蘇聯(lián)式共產(chǎn)主義，而更多契合中國(guó)歷史悠久的儒家平等主義訴求。中國(guó)化的社會(huì)主義、中國(guó)的文化傳統(tǒng)，以及為現(xiàn)代化的訴求所付出的巨大犧牲，一起構(gòu)成了中共深深植根民心的道德合法性，這絕非經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)所帶來(lái)的“政績(jī)合法性”所能相提并論的。由此就不難理解，在中共執(zhí)政以來(lái)的63年里，雖然經(jīng)歷了那么多次極為困難的歷史階段，包括災(zāi)難性的“大躍進(jìn)”和“文化大革命”時(shí)期，社會(huì)主體包括中下層也從未對(duì)中共失去信任。這種信任使中共有時(shí)間和空間進(jìn)行反思調(diào)整，開(kāi)展自我革新。從高速的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)到成功的太空探索，當(dāng)代中國(guó)所取得的成就無(wú)一不使國(guó)民——尤其是青年一代——的民族主義情緒更加高漲。未來(lái)幾十年中，隨著中國(guó)的進(jìn)一步崛起，中共獲得的政治支持只會(huì)水漲船高。

當(dāng)然，為了保持政治穩(wěn)定，中共也不得不采取某些壓制措施。因此，西方的一些中國(guó)問(wèn)題專(zhuān)家堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，鎮(zhèn)壓就是中共得以實(shí)行統(tǒng)治的真正力量。他們指出中國(guó)實(shí)行的嚴(yán)格審查制度、對(duì)異議人士采取的打壓舉措，并對(duì)此進(jìn)行批評(píng)。他們說(shuō)的這些都是事實(shí)。其實(shí)中共清楚知道，壓制不是鞏固執(zhí)政地位之道，并務(wù)實(shí)地采取了更巧妙的遏制策略。具體而言，就是允許并保障絕大多數(shù)民眾最大程度的個(gè)人自由。今天的中國(guó)民眾，要比近代史上任何一個(gè)時(shí)期都享有更多的自由，大部分人可以自由生活、自主擇業(yè)、自行創(chuàng)業(yè)，在海內(nèi)外自由旅行，在網(wǎng)上公開(kāi)批評(píng)政府而不用擔(dān)心受到打擊報(bào)復(fù)。與此同時(shí)，政府堅(jiān)決打擊極少數(shù)旨在顛覆中共政權(quán)的政治反對(duì)人士。眾所周知，近十年來(lái)網(wǎng)絡(luò)、報(bào)刊上對(duì)政府的批評(píng)呈爆發(fā)式增長(zhǎng)，對(duì)此政府并未嚴(yán)厲打壓；全國(guó)各地因政策爭(zhēng)議引發(fā)的群體性事件，每年多達(dá)數(shù)萬(wàn)起，但基本上都以和平方式平息。然而，政府對(duì)于旨在推翻現(xiàn)有政治制度的極少數(shù)人絕不會(huì)稍有容情，比如激進(jìn)的劉曉波鼓吹終結(jié)中共執(zhí)政地位，結(jié)果就被重判入獄。

當(dāng)然，中共的執(zhí)政地位并非高枕無(wú)憂(yōu)。當(dāng)下，腐敗猖獗對(duì)中共的聲譽(yù)構(gòu)成巨大損壞。實(shí)際上，與其說(shuō)腐敗是中國(guó)政治制度自身固有的問(wèn)題，不如說(shuō)是國(guó)家快速發(fā)展的副產(chǎn)品。一個(gè)半世紀(jì)前，當(dāng)美國(guó)經(jīng)歷經(jīng)濟(jì)快速增長(zhǎng)和工業(yè)急劇擴(kuò)張時(shí)，暴力犯罪、貧富分化和官員腐敗程度比今日中國(guó)更甚。就當(dāng)代的橫向比較而言，據(jù)透明國(guó)際發(fā)布的全球清廉指數(shù)排名，中國(guó)位居第75位，且呈逐年上升之勢(shì)，排名高于很多實(shí)行多黨選舉的所謂民主制國(guó)家，譬如希臘（第80位）、印度（第95位）、印度尼西亞與阿根廷（并列第100位）、菲律賓（第129位）?？梢?jiàn)，中共的腐敗問(wèn)題遠(yuǎn)非無(wú)可救藥，而且依托民眾對(duì)中共的高度認(rèn)同和支持，完全有時(shí)間和機(jī)會(huì)從容應(yīng)對(duì)這一艱巨挑戰(zhàn)。

龍的時(shí)代

十八大選舉產(chǎn)生的新領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體將在未來(lái)十年中領(lǐng)導(dǎo)中國(guó)。這十年中，中國(guó)將面臨重重挑戰(zhàn)，而中共自我改革的適應(yīng)能力、選賢任能的組織制度、深植民心的執(zhí)政合法性，將成為其戰(zhàn)勝各種挑戰(zhàn)的堅(jiān)強(qiáng)依托。當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)增速放緩的勢(shì)頭令人不安，但這一現(xiàn)象更多屬于正常的經(jīng)濟(jì)周期，并不意味中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)遭遇到結(jié)構(gòu)性瓶頸。在未來(lái)二三十年中，由于城鎮(zhèn)化和創(chuàng)業(yè)型經(jīng)濟(jì)的助力，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)良好的增長(zhǎng)態(tài)勢(shì)將至少再保持一代人。1990年，只有25%的中國(guó)人居住在城市里，今天這一人數(shù)已超過(guò)半數(shù)，增至51%，并有望在2040年前達(dá)到75%。這意味著中國(guó)將有近10億城市人口，產(chǎn)生對(duì)新建道路、住房、供能、通訊基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施等的極大需求。即使基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和房地產(chǎn)建設(shè)產(chǎn)生暫時(shí)性泡沫，也會(huì)被巨大的需求消化掉。事實(shí)上，在未來(lái)若干年，中國(guó)社會(huì)的城市化進(jìn)程使決策層必須保持甚至加大對(duì)這些領(lǐng)域的投資力度。投資對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的拉動(dòng)效應(yīng)，以及新增城市人口的生產(chǎn)和消費(fèi)能力，足以推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)高速增長(zhǎng)。中共的政治權(quán)威，以及卓越的政策制定和施行能力，將為中國(guó)成功實(shí)現(xiàn)這一歷史跨越保駕護(hù)航。

與此同時(shí)，創(chuàng)業(yè)型經(jīng)濟(jì)將幫助中國(guó)克服其出口驅(qū)動(dòng)型增長(zhǎng)模式的痼疾。在中國(guó)外部，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退以及人民幣升值，正逐漸擠壓中國(guó)的出口。在中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)，沿海工業(yè)地區(qū)勞動(dòng)力成本上升，削弱了出口的價(jià)格優(yōu)勢(shì)。但是，這些問(wèn)題會(huì)在市場(chǎng)中自然消化。畢竟中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的奇跡不是靠政府高層設(shè)計(jì)出來(lái)的，而是通過(guò)大力發(fā)展市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)，培育了一大批活躍的私營(yíng)企業(yè)扎實(shí)干出來(lái)的。在沿海地區(qū)，許多企業(yè)的業(yè)務(wù)正迅速向價(jià)值鏈的高端延伸，一些低端制造業(yè)開(kāi)始從沿海向內(nèi)地遷移，以有效控制勞動(dòng)力成本，這正好契合了中西部地方政府加大基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資、促進(jìn)產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)創(chuàng)新的思路。

中國(guó)的創(chuàng)業(yè)型新經(jīng)濟(jì)更是朝氣蓬勃，將繼續(xù)推動(dòng)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的高速度和高質(zhì)量的發(fā)展。近年來(lái)，無(wú)數(shù)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)者從零開(kāi)始，打造全球網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟(jì)的領(lǐng)頭羊企業(yè)，僅阿里巴巴一家公司就在短短幾年里創(chuàng)造了上百萬(wàn)的就業(yè)和從商機(jī)會(huì)。

確實(shí)，十八大后，政府需要推出一系列經(jīng)濟(jì)改革舉措。例如，在某些領(lǐng)域，國(guó)有企業(yè)過(guò)于膨脹，擠壓了民營(yíng)企業(yè)的發(fā)展空間，導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)活力下降。政府已經(jīng)看到這些問(wèn)題，并在醞釀出臺(tái)硬性要求國(guó)有企業(yè)向股東分紅和其它限制橫向擴(kuò)張的調(diào)整性政策。止步不前的金融自由化政策有望重啟，或?qū)⒑w利率市場(chǎng)化和發(fā)展中小型私營(yíng)金融機(jī)構(gòu)。這將打破國(guó)有銀行的壟斷地位，進(jìn)一步激活信貸市場(chǎng)。上述種種舉措，都將大大有利于資本向產(chǎn)業(yè)投資。

隨著中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)日趨開(kāi)放，社會(huì)政策方面也需適時(shí)調(diào)整。在完善社會(huì)管理方面，決策者可能會(huì)雙管齊下。首先，中共將致力于增強(qiáng)包容性，江澤民時(shí)期開(kāi)啟的吸納新社會(huì)階層人士入黨的思路有望繼續(xù)延續(xù)。其次，中共將嘗試讓合法的非政府組織參與社會(huì)福利管理。隨著城鎮(zhèn)化的快速推進(jìn)，中國(guó)將出現(xiàn)一個(gè)龐大的中等收入階層。令西方人士大跌眼鏡的是，新出現(xiàn)的中產(chǎn)階層并不追求抽象的政治訴求，而是十分關(guān)注切實(shí)的“民生”問(wèn)題。要應(yīng)對(duì)如此多的新問(wèn)題，單靠政府包打天下恐怕不行。因此，向私人企業(yè)和非政府組織開(kāi)放醫(yī)療、教育服務(wù)領(lǐng)域，就成為一舉兩得的政策選項(xiàng)。據(jù)說(shuō)廣東已經(jīng)率先開(kāi)展類(lèi)似試點(diǎn)。

腐敗無(wú)疑是最難攻克的關(guān)口。近年來(lái)，中共一些高級(jí)干部的親屬利用其政治影響建立關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)，以謀取商業(yè)利益。從高層到地方，都有政經(jīng)精英千絲萬(wàn)縷的裙帶關(guān)系網(wǎng)，無(wú)時(shí)無(wú)刻不在損害民眾對(duì)中共的合法性認(rèn)同。在反腐方面，中共正逐漸摸索出新思路，并有望在換屆完成后全力出擊。在具體的反腐舉措上，很可能是三管齊下。在當(dāng)前所有的反腐機(jī)構(gòu)中，最重要的莫過(guò)于中共中央紀(jì)律檢查委員會(huì)。中央紀(jì)委地位崇高，其負(fù)責(zé)人一般都由政治局常委擔(dān)任，紀(jì)委權(quán)力運(yùn)作在起動(dòng)司法程序之前，可直接要求有腐敗嫌疑的黨員在規(guī)定的時(shí)間和地點(diǎn)交待問(wèn)題，這在一定程度上避免了繁瑣的法律障礙。近年以來(lái)，在對(duì)腐敗干部的追查中，紀(jì)委的角色和作用越來(lái)越大。在2011年，紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察機(jī)關(guān)共立案137859件，相關(guān)責(zé)任人受到黨紀(jì)處分，甚至被移送司法。在1989年的政治風(fēng)波中，腐敗問(wèn)題曾是一大導(dǎo)火索。自此之后中共對(duì)反腐常抓不懈，當(dāng)前的查處數(shù)字接近1989年前的四倍，即為最鮮明的例證。核心領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層的違法違紀(jì)問(wèn)題對(duì)中共的威信損害最大，新的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)集體是否會(huì)支持中紀(jì)委打破禁忌，從頂層果斷反腐，將具有風(fēng)向標(biāo)的意義。

近年來(lái)，國(guó)有媒體和私營(yíng)媒體都日趨獨(dú)立，已成為政府反腐敗的重要支持力量。干部的腐敗行為一旦被曝光，就會(huì)在網(wǎng)上迅速傳播，形成媒體事件。有關(guān)部門(mén)會(huì)迅速追查被曝光的腐敗案件，并發(fā)布調(diào)查結(jié)果。這是全新的現(xiàn)象，其中不乏爭(zhēng)議性問(wèn)題，尤其是媒體行業(yè)自身也很腐敗。賄賂記者和新聞造假早已司空見(jiàn)慣。如果這一情形無(wú)法迅速改觀，中國(guó)的媒體將很快喪失僅有的一點(diǎn)公信力。

因此政府換屆之后，或?qū)募訌?qiáng)政治監(jiān)管和法律約束，促進(jìn)新興媒體行業(yè)的發(fā)展和成熟。政府已在討論制定有關(guān)行業(yè)法規(guī)，以保護(hù)真實(shí)、合法的新聞報(bào)道，并懲戒誹謗、不實(shí)的謠言?；蛟S有人懷疑政府試圖以此控制媒體，但更重要的是，媒體應(yīng)借此機(jī)會(huì)提高自己的公信力。一個(gè)索賄和造謠事件頻發(fā)的新聞媒體行業(yè)，是不可能真正遏制腐敗的。

最后，中共會(huì)在黨內(nèi)促進(jìn)開(kāi)放性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，這在一定程度上是基層各種創(chuàng)新性實(shí)驗(yàn)的啟發(fā)。黨內(nèi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)將有助于遏制黨員的不當(dāng)行為。胡錦濤總書(shū)記提出要推行“黨內(nèi)民主”，支持用差額選舉產(chǎn)生黨的各級(jí)委員會(huì)，這一提法在十八大上獲得熱烈擁護(hù)。

鳳凰涅槃

如果十八大的戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃能夠一一落實(shí)，2012年將被后世視為世界政治史的分水嶺。迄今為止，世界依舊受制于西方式選舉民主的話(huà)語(yǔ)霸權(quán)，認(rèn)為只有多黨選舉才能保證良治，并天生具有合法性。與中國(guó)的崛起形成鮮明對(duì)照的是，西方世界正陷入政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)的雙重危機(jī)。冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后僅僅一代人的時(shí)間，美國(guó)的中產(chǎn)階級(jí)已然大批消亡；基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施大量失修而無(wú)人問(wèn)津；政治上無(wú)論是選舉還是立法，都受制于資本和利益集團(tuán)操縱；巨額赤字和負(fù)債吞噬了未來(lái)幾代人的財(cái)富，民眾生活水平持續(xù)下滑態(tài)勢(shì)不可避免。在大西洋彼岸，歐盟各國(guó)在政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)各領(lǐng)域迅速衰朽。至于雄心勃勃的歐洲計(jì)劃，現(xiàn)在已無(wú)異于一條觸礁擱淺的船。而在此期間，中國(guó)不僅使幾億人擺脫了貧困，還一舉成為世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的引擎。

西方遭遇的這些困境都是自找的。由于過(guò)分自負(fù)自滿(mǎn)地相信選舉制度是絕對(duì)可靠的，西方民主政治已經(jīng)缺失了自我修正的能力。選舉被看作是最終目的，而不是形成良政的手段。在選舉政治下，選出出類(lèi)拔萃的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人已經(jīng)困難重重，有能力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人若想在現(xiàn)有體制內(nèi)有所作為，更是難于登天。即使偶爾有少數(shù)出色的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人上臺(tái)，還是免不了要面對(duì)被政治、法律桎梏牢牢捆住手腳的局面，實(shí)際上是寸步難行。就在美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)卿希拉里?克林頓穿行往來(lái)與世界各地，鼓吹選舉民主的同時(shí)，美國(guó)政府各部門(mén)的合法性正瀕臨破產(chǎn)。今年11月，美國(guó)民眾對(duì)國(guó)會(huì)的支持率只有可憐的18%；對(duì)總統(tǒng)的支持率稍高，約為50%；甚至一直標(biāo)榜政治獨(dú)立的最高法院，其支持率最近也跌破了50%。

許多發(fā)展中國(guó)家已意識(shí)到，民主不是包治百病的靈丹妙藥。對(duì)這些彷徨者來(lái)說(shuō)，中國(guó)的成功無(wú)疑更具有啟發(fā)性。中國(guó)的崛起與西方民主國(guó)家的衰落，向全世界提供了鮮明的對(duì)照。當(dāng)然，中國(guó)模式的政治制度不可能取代西式選舉民主，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)從不將自己的政治模式包裝成普世通用的典范，也不會(huì)對(duì)外輸出。但中國(guó)的模式足以啟發(fā)各國(guó)思考，如果一國(guó)政治制度不契合本國(guó)的文化、歷史條件，結(jié)果一定是水土不服。中國(guó)模式的意義，不在于向世界各國(guó)提供足以替代民主制的靈丹妙藥，而在于從實(shí)踐上證明了良政的模式不是單一而是多元的，各國(guó)都能找到適合本國(guó)的政治制度。24年前，政治學(xué)家弗朗西斯?福山預(yù)言民主將一統(tǒng)天下，慨嘆歷史從此終結(jié)，世界陷入一片靜寂。現(xiàn)在看來(lái)，福山是杞人憂(yōu)天，一個(gè)更精彩的時(shí)代正緩緩拉開(kāi)帷幕。

（本文原文刊發(fā)于最新一期美國(guó)《Foreign Affairs》雜志，作者中文首發(fā)于觀察者網(wǎng)站）

"Reprinted by permission of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (January/February 2013). Copyright 2013 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. (www.ForeignAffairs.com)

李世默是上海的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家和政治學(xué)者，閱讀該作者專(zhuān)欄請(qǐng)點(diǎn)擊 

The Life of the Party 

The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China

By Eric X. Li

January/February 2013

ERIC X. LI is a venture capitalist and political scientist in Shanghai.

In November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 18th National Congress, setting in motion a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. As expected, Xi Jinping took over as general secretary and will become the president of the People's Republic this March. The turnover was a smooth and well-orchestrated demonstration by a confidently rising superpower. That didn't stop international media and even some Chinese intellectuals, however, from portraying it as a moment of crisis. In an issue that was published before the beginning of the congress, for example, The Economist quoted unnamed scholars at a recent conference as saying that China is "unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top." To be sure, months before the handover, the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, the former party boss of the Chongqing municipality, had shattered the CCP's long-held facade of unity, which had underwritten domestic political stability since the Tiananmen Square upheavals in 1989. To make matters worse, the Chinese economy, which had sustained double-digit GDP growth for two decades, slowed, decelerating for seven straight quarters. China's economic model of rapid industrialization, labor-intensive manufacturing, large-scale government investments in infrastructure, and export growth seemed to have nearly run its course. Some in China and the West have gone so far as to predict the demise of the one-party state, which they allege cannot survive if leading politicians stop delivering economic miracles.

Such pessimism, however, is misplaced. There is no doubt that daunting challenges await Xi. But those who suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread China's politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to meet the country's ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP's adaptability, system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country's leaders will consolidate the one party model and, in the process, challenge the West's conventional wisdom about political development and the inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a post-democratic future.

ON-THE-JOB LEARNING

The assertion that one-party rule is inherently incapable of self-correction does not reflect the historical record. During its 63 years in power, the CCP has shown extraordinary adaptability. Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic has pursued a broad range of economic policies. First, the CCP initiated radical land collectivization in the early 1950s. This was followed by the policies of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. After them came the quasi-privatization of farmland in the early 1960s, Deng Xiaoping's market reforms in the late 1970s, and Jiang Zemin's opening up of the CCP's membership to private businesspeople in the 1990s. The underlying goal has always been economic health, and when a policy did not work-for example, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution-China was able to find something that did: for example, Deng's reforms, which catapulted the Chinese economy into the position of second largest in the world.

On the institutional front as well, the CCP has not shied away from reform. One example is the introduction in the 1980s and 1990s of term limits for most political positions (and even of age limits, of 68–70, for the party's most senior leadership). Before this, political leaders had been able to use their positions to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao Zedong was a case in point. He had ended the civil wars that had plagued China and repelled foreign invasions to become the father of modern China. Yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes, such as the Cultural Revolution. Now, it is nearly impossible for the few at the top to consolidate long-term power. Upward mobility within the party has also increased.

In terms of foreign policy, China has also changed course many times to achieve national greatness. It moved from a close alliance with Moscow in the 1950s to a virtual alliance with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s as it sought to contain the Soviet Union. Today, its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy has once more put it at odds with the United States. But in its ongoing quest for greatness, China is seeking to defy recent historical precedents and rise peacefully, avoiding the militarism that plagued Germany and Japan in the first half of the last century.

As China undergoes its ten-year transition, calls at home and abroad for another round of political reform have increased. One radical camp in China and abroad is urging the party to allow multiparty elections or at least accept formal intraparty factions. In this view, only full-scale adversarial politics can ensure that China gets the leadership it needs. However sincere, these demands all miss a basic fact: the CCP has arguably been one of the most self-reforming political organizations in recent world history. There is no doubt that China's new leaders face a different world than Hu Jintao did when he took over in 2002, but chances are good that Xi's CCP will be able to adapt to and meet whatever new challenges the rapidly changing domestic and international environments pose. In part, that is because the CCP is heavily meritocratic and promotes those with proven experience and capabilities.

MAKING THE GRADE

China watchers in the West have used reports of corruption-compounded by sensational political scandals such as the Bo Xilai affair-to portray the ruling party as incurably diseased. The disease exists, to be sure, but the most important treatment is the party itself. As counterintuitive as it might seem to Westerners, the CCP, whose political preeminence is enshrined in the Chinese constitution, is one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world.

Of the 25 members that made up the pre-18th-Congress Politburo, the highest ruling body of the CCP, only five (the so-called princelings) came from privileged backgrounds. The other 20, including the president, Hu, and the premier, Wen Jiabao, came from middle- or lower-class backgrounds. In the CCP's larger Central Committee, which was made up of more than 300 people, the percentage of people born into wealth and power was even smaller. The vast majority of those in government worked and competed their way through the ranks to the top. Admittedly, the new general secretary, Xi, is the son of a previous party leader. However, an overwhelming number of those who moved up the ranks this past fall had humbler beginnings.

So how does China ensure meritocracy? At the heart of the story is a powerful institution that is seldom studied in the West, the Organization Department of the CCP. This department carries out an elaborate process of bureaucratic selection, evaluation, and promotion that would be the envy of any corporation. Patronage continues to play a role, but by and large, merit determines who will rise through the ranks.

Every year, the government and its affiliated organizations recruit university graduates into entry-level positions in one of the three state-controlled systems: the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and government-affiliated social organizations such as universities or community programs. Most new recruits enter at the lowest level, or ke yuan. After a few years, the Organization Department reviews their performance and can promote them up through four increasingly elite managerial ranks: fu ke, ke, fu chu, and chu. The range of positions at these levels is wide, covering anything from running the health-care system in a poor village to attracting commercial investment in a city district. Once a year, the Organization Department reviews quantitative performance records for each official in each of these grades; carries out interviews with superiors, peers, and subordinates; and vets personal conduct. Extensive and frequent public opinion surveys are also conducted on questions ranging from satisfaction with the country's general direction to opinions about more mundane and specific local policies. Once the department has gathered a complete dossier on all the candidates, and has confirmed the public's general satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their performances, committees discuss the data and promote winners.

After this stage, public employees' paths diverge, and individuals can be rotated through and out of all three tracks (the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations). An official might start out working on economic policy and then move to a job dealing with political or social issues. He or she could go from a traditional government position to a managerial role in a state-owned enterprise or a university. In many cases, the Organization Department will also send a large number of promising officials abroad to learn best practices around the world. The likes of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and the National University of Singapore regularly host Chinese officials in their training programs.

Over time, the most successful workers are promoted again, to what are known as the fu ju and ju levels, at which point a typical assignment is to manage districts with populations in the millions or companies with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. To get a sense of how rigorous the selection process is, in 2012, there were 900,000 officials at the fu ke and ke levels and 600,000 at the fu chu and chu levels. There were only 40,000 at the fu ju and ju levels.

After the ju level, a very talented few move up several more ranks and eventually make it to the party's Central Committee. The entire process could take two to three decades, and most of those who make it to the top have had managerial experience in just about every sector of Chinese society. Indeed, of the 25 Politburo members before the 18th Party Congress, 19 had run provinces larger than most countries in the world and ministries with budgets higher than that of the average nation's government. A person with Barack Obama's pre-presidential professional experience would not even be the manager of a small county in China's system.

Xi's career path is illustrative. Over the course of 30 years, Xi rose from being a fu ke level deputy county chief in a poor village to party secretary of Shanghai and a member of the Politburo. By the time he made it to the top, Xi had already managed areas with total populations of over 150 million and combined GDPs of more than $1.5 trillion. His career demonstrates that meritocracy drives Chinese politics and that those who end up leading the country have proven records.

INNOVATE OR STAGNATE

China's centralized meritocracy also fosters government entrepreneurship. The practice of conducting top-down policy experiments in select locales and expanding the successful ones nationwide is well documented. The best-known example is Deng's creation of "special economic zones" in the 1980s. The first such zone was in Shenzhen. The district was encouraged to operate under market principles rather than the dictates of central planners. Shenzhen's economy grew rapidly, which prompted the central government to replicate the program in the cities of Zhuhai and Shantou, in Guangdong Province; Xiamen, in Fujian Province; and throughout Hainan Province.

There are also thousands of policy experiments that rise up from the local level. The competitive government job market gives capable local officials incentives to take risks and differentiate themselves from the pack. Among the 2,326 party representatives who attended the 18th Party Congress, one such standout was Qiu He, who is vice party secretary of Yunnan Province. At the congress, Qiu was selected as an alternate member of the Central Committee, putting the 55-year-old maverick near the top of the nation's political establishment. Qiu is the ultimate political entrepreneur. Born into poverty in rural China, Qiu watched two of his eight siblings die of childhood illness and malnutrition. After taking the national college entrance exam, China's great equalizer, he was able to attend university. When he entered the work force, he held several low-level civil service jobs before being appointed party secretary of Shuyang County, in northern Jiangsu Province, in the 1990s. With a peasant population of 1.7 million and an annual per capita GDP of only $250 (less than one-fifth the national average), Shuyang was one of the poorest rural areas in the country. The county also suffered from the worst crime rate in the region and endemic government corruption.

Qiu carried out a broad range of risky and controversial policy experiments that, if they failed, would have sunk his political career. His first focus was Shuyang's floundering economy. In 1997, Qiu initiated a mandatory municipal bond purchase program. The policy required every county resident to purchase bonds to fund much-needed infrastructure development. The genius of the plan was twofold. First, he could not have raised the funds through taxes because, at his level, he had no taxation authority. Second, the mandatory bond program offered the citizens of Shuyang something taxes would not have: yes, they were required to buy the bonds, but they eventually got their money back, with interest. Qiu also assigned quotas to almost every county government official for attracting commercial investments. To support their efforts, in addition to building up the area's infrastructure, Qiu offered favorable tax rates and cheap land concessions to businesses. In just a few years, thousands of private enterprises sprang up and transformed a dormant, centrally planned rural community into a vibrant market economy.

Qiu's second focus was combating corruption and mistrust between the population and the government. In the late 1990s, he instituted two unprecedented measures to make the selection of officials more open and competitive. One was to post upcoming official appointments in advance of the final decisions to allow for a public comment period. The other was the introduction of a two-tier voting system that enabled villagers to vote among party members for their preferred candidates for certain positions. The local party committee then picked between the top two vote getters.

Qiu initially met tremendous resistance from the local bureaucracy and population. But today, he is credited with turning one of the country's most backward regions into a vibrant urban center of commerce and manufacturing. Other poor regions have adopted many of his economic policy experiments. Moreover, the public commenting period has been widely adopted across China. Competitive voting is finding its way into ever-higher levels of the party hierarchy. Qiu has been personally rewarded, too, moving rapidly up the ladder: to vice governor of Jiangsu Province, mayor of Kunmin, vice party secretary of Yunnan Province, and now an alternate member of the Central Committee.

Even if critics accept that the Chinese government is adaptable and meritocratic, they still question its legitimacy. Westerners assume that multiparty elections are the only source of political legitimacy. Because China does not hold such elections, they argue, the CCP's rule rests on inherently shaky ground. Following this logic, critics have predicted the party's collapse for decades, but no collapse has come. The most recent version of the argument is that the CCP has maintained its hold on power only because it has delivered economic growth -- so-called performance legitimacy.

No doubt, performance is a major source of the party's popularity. In a poll of Chinese attitudes published by the Pew Research Center in 2011, 87 percent of respondents noted satisfaction with the general direction of the country, 66 percent reported significant progress in their lives in the past five years, and a whopping 74 percent said they expected the future to be even better. Performance legitimacy, however, is only one source of the party's popular support. Much more significant is the role of Chinese nationalism and moral legitimacy.

When the CCP built the Monument to the People's Heroes at the center of Tiananmen Square in 1949, it included a frieze depicting the struggles of the Chinese to establish the People's Republic. One would expect the CCP, a Marxist-Leninist party, to have its most symbolic political narrative begin with communism -- the writing of The Communist Manifesto, for example, or perhaps the birth of the CCP in 1921. Instead, the first carving of the frieze depicts an event from 1839: the public burning of imported opium by the Qing dynasty's imperial minister, Lin Zexu, which triggered the first Opium War. China's subsequent loss to the British inaugurated the so-called century of humiliation. In the following hundred years, China suffered countless invasions, wars, and famines -- all, in the popular telling, to reach 1949. And today, the Monument to the People's Heroes remains a sacred public site and the most significant symbol of the CCP's national moral authority.

The CCP's role in saving and modernizing China is a far more durable source of its legitimacy than the country's economic performance. It explains why, even at the worst times of the party's rule in the past 63 years, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP was able to keep the support of mainstream Chinese long enough for it to correct its mistakes. China's recent achievements, from economic growth to space exploration, are only strengthening nationalist sentiments in the country, especially among the youth. The party can count on their support for decades to come.

A final type of staying power comes from repression, which China watchers in the West claim is the real force behind the CCP. They point to censorship and the regime's harsh treatment of dissidents, which undoubtedly exist. Still, the party knows very well that general repression is not sustainable. Instead, it seeks to employ smart containment. The strategy is to give the vast majority of people the widest range possible of personal liberties. And today, Chinese people are freer than at any other period in recent memory; most of them can live where they want and work as they choose, go into business without hindrance, travel within and out of the country, and openly criticize the government online without retaliation. Meanwhile, state power focuses on containing a small number of individuals who have political agendas and want to topple the one-party system. As any casual observer would know, over the last ten years, the quantity of criticism against the government online and in print has increased exponentially -- without any reprisals. Every year, there are tens of thousands of local protests against specific policies. Most of the disputes are resolved peacefully. But the government deals forcefully with the very few who aim to subvert China's political system, such as Liu Xiaobo, an activist who calls for the end of single-party rule and who is currently in jail.

That is not to say that there aren't problems. Corruption, for one, could seriously harm the CCP's reputation. But it will not derail party rule anytime soon. Far from being a problem inherent to the Chinese political system, corruption is largely a byproduct of the country's rapid transformation. When the United States was going through its industrialization 150 years ago, violence, the wealth gap, and corruption in the country were just as bad as, if not worse than, in China today. According to Transparency International, China ranks 75th in global corruption and is gradually getting better. It is less corrupt than Greece (80th), India (95th), Indonesia and Argentina (tied at 100th), and the Philippines (129th) -- all of which are electoral democracies. Understood in such a context, the Chinese government's corruption is by no means insurmountable. And the party's deeply rooted popular support will allow it the breathing room to grapple with even the toughest problems.

ENTER THE DRAGON

China's new leaders will govern the country for the next ten years, during which they will rely on the CCP's adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy to tackle major challenges. The current economic slowdown is worrying, but it is largely cyclical, not structural. Two forces will reinvigorate the economy for at least another generation: urbanization and entrepreneurship. In 1990, only about 25 percent of Chinese lived in cities. Today, 51 percent do. Before 2040, a full 75 percent -- nearly one billion people -- are expected to be urban. The amount of new roads, housing, utilities, and communications infrastructure needed to accommodate this expansion is astounding. Therefore, any apparent infrastructure or housing bubbles will be momentary. In fact, China's new leadership will need to continue or even increase investment in these sectors in the years to come. That investment and the vast new urban work force, with all its production and consumption, will drive high economic growth rates. The party's extraordinary ability to develop and execute policy and its political authority will help it manage these processes.

Meanwhile, entrepreneurship will help China overcome threats to its export-fueled economic model. Externally, the global economic downturn and a rising currency value have dampened Chinese trade. Internally, labor costs have risen in the country's coastal manufacturing regions. But the market will sort out these problems. After all, China's economic miracle was not just a centrally planned phenomenon. Beijing facilitated the development of a powerful market economy, but private entrepreneurs are the lifeblood of the system. And these entrepreneurs are highly adaptive. Already, some low-end manufacturing has moved inland to contain labor costs. This is coinciding with local governments' aggressive infrastructure investments and innovative efforts to attract new business. In the costal regions, many companies are producing increasingly-higher-value goods.

Of course, the government will need to make some economic adjustments. For one, many state-owned enterprises have grown too big, crowding out the private-sector growth that is critical to economic vitality. Plans to require companies to pay out dividends to shareholders and other limits on expansion are already in the works. These will likely be implemented early on in the new administration. And some stalled measures encouraging financial liberalization, such as allowing the market to determine interest rates and the development of private small and medium-sized lending institutions, which would break the large state-owned banks' near monopoly in commercial lending, are likely to get picked up. These reforms would facilitate more efficient flows of capital to businesses.

Economic liberalization will likely be matched by a two-track reform of social policy. First, the process of making the party more inclusive, which began with Jiang's inclusion of businesspeople in the CCP, will be accelerated. Second, the CCP will begin experimenting with outsourcing certain social welfare functions to approved nongovernmental organizations. Rapid urbanization is facilitating the growth of a large middle-income society. Instead of demanding abstract political rights, as many in the West expected, urban Chinese are focused on what are called min sheng (livelihood) issues. The party may not be able to manage these concerns alone. And so private businesses or nongovernmental organizations might be called in to provide health care and education in the cities, which has already started to happen in Guangdong Province.

Corruption remains the hardest nut to crack. In recent years, family members of some party leaders have used their political influence to build up large networks of commercial interests. Cronyism is spreading from the top down, which could eventually threaten the party's rule. The CCP has articulated a three-pronged strategy to attack the problem, which the new leadership will carry out. The most important institution for containing corruption is the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Its leader usually sits on the Standing Committee of the Politburo and has more power than the state judiciary. This person can detain and interrogate party members suspected of corruption without legal limits. In recent years, the commission has been very aggressive. In 2011, it conducted formal investigations into 137,859 cases that resulted in disciplinary actions or legal convictions against party officials. This number represents a nearly fourfold increase since the years before 1989, when corruption was one of the main issues that drove the Tiananmen protests. One sign to watch in the next administration is whether the commission is authorized to investigate wrongdoing within the inner sanctum of the party leadership, where corruption can be the most detrimental to the party's credibility.

Complementing the party's own antigraft efforts is the increasing independence of media outlets, both state- and privately owned. News organizations have already exposed cases of official corruption and disseminated their findings on the Internet. The CCP has responded by pursuing some of the cases that the media have brought to light. Of course, this system is not perfect, and some media outlets are themselves corrupt. Illicit payments to journalists and fabricated stories are commonplace. If these problems are not corrected quickly, Chinese media will lose what little credibility they have gained.

Accordingly, the next administration might develop more sophisticated political regulations and legal constraints on journalists to provide space for the sector to mature. Officials have already discussed instituting a press law that would protect legitimate, factual reporting and penalize acts of libel and misrepresentation. Some might view the initiative as the government reining in journalists, but the larger impact would be to make the media more credible in the eyes of the Chinese public. Journalists who take bribes or invent rumors to attract readers can hardly check government corruption.

Also to tackle corruption, the party plans to increase open competition within its own ranks, inspired by the efforts of officials such as Qiu. The hope is that such competition will air dirty laundry and discourage unseemly behavior. The Hu administration initiated an "intraparty democracy" program to facilitate direct competition for seats on party committees, an idea that received high praise at the 18th Congress.

HISTORY'S RESTART

Should the 18th Party Congress' initiatives succeed, 2012 might one day be seen as marking the end of the idea that electoral democracy is the only legitimate and effective system of political governance. While China's might grows, the West's ills multiply: since winning the Cold War, the United States has, in one generation, allowed its middle class to disintegrate. Its infrastructure languishes in disrepair, and its politics, both electoral and legislative, have fallen captive to money and special interests. Its future generations will be so heavily indebted that a sustained decline in average living standards is all but certain. In Europe, too, monumental political, economic, and social distress has caused the European project to run aground. Meanwhile, during the same period, China has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and is now a leading industrial powerhouse.

The West's woes are self-inflicted. Claims that Western electoral systems are infallible have hampered self-correction. Elections are seen as ends in themselves, not merely means to good governance. Instead of producing capable leaders, electoral politics have made it very difficult for good leaders to gain power. And in the few cases when they do, they are paralyzed by their own political and legal systems. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travels around the world extolling electoral democracy, the legitimacy of nearly all U.S. political institutions is crumbling. The approval rating of the U.S. Congress among the American people stood at 18 percent in November. The president was performing somewhat better, with ratings in the 50s. And even support for the politically independent Supreme Court had fallen below 50 percent.

Many developing countries have already come to learn that democracy doesn't solve all their problems. For them, China's example is important. Its recent success and the failures of the West offer a stark contrast. To be sure, China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy because, unlike the latter, it does not pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But its success does show that many systems of political governance can work when they are congruent with a country's culture and history. The significance of China's success, then, is not that China provides the world with an alternative but that it demonstrates that successful alternatives exist. Twenty-four years ago, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama predicted that all countries would eventually adopt liberal democracy and lamented that the world would become a boring place because of that. Relief is on the way. A more interesting age may be upon us. 

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"Reprinted by permission of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (January/February 2013). Copyright 2013 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. (www.ForeignAffairs.com)