以下為英文提要和采訪原文：

Club Briefing: Andrey Sushentsov,  Head of the Department of International Relations at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), gave an exclusive interview to Beijing Club for International Dialogue in Sanya. He pointed out that the “White House disputes” reflect a shift in Ukraine’s position within U.S. strategy and highlight Trump’s realist stance on the Ukraine issue. In contrast, most European countries lack strategic foresight and are unqualified to sit at the negotiating table. In the future, the security landscape of Europe will largely be determined by the United States and Russia.

Sushentsov believes that the U.S. attempt to “align with Russia against China” is destined to fail. China and Russia have a solid foundation of cooperation in trade and culture and share the historic mission of building a secure and prosperous Eurasia. The past few years have fully demonstrated that the United States lacks the capability to truly influence Russia’s strategic choices. At the same time, Russia will continue to deepen its strategic ties with China and the broader Global South, as these nations are emerging as the new center of global development.

Jersey Lee

What's your reaction to what happened in the White House between Trump and Zelensky?

Andrey Sushentsov

Zelensky imagined himself as one of the great leaders of the west, like Winston Churchill or Charles De Gaulle, Franklin Roosevelt. And he tried to manipulate American administration into believing that Ukraine is not an instrument of American strategy, but a subject of a major geopolitical play, and can impose on americans its own designs on how the crisis can develop. Essentially, they have broken this standing at that meeting. Trump proclaimed that he wants to make peace. Zelensky tried to develop an idea that he wants to continue the war with American support, and he required the support in significant amount.

I think that symbolically, this is the end of the American strategy on supporting Ukraine as an instrument against Russia, and the beginning of a withdrawal of American strategic interests from the European continent.

Jersey Lee

What do you think of the mineral deal, and why did Trump propose it?

Andrey Sushentsov

United States under trump is trying to figure out how to extract value from the investments in Ukraine: political investments, military investments that the American administration have been following for several years, intensively for three last years, but for several decades prior to that, also.

Trump considers these investments, these political investments, as a setback for American interests, it drew United States into a significant military clash, indirect military clash with Russia, and cost Americans dozens of billions of dollars.

Trump is trying to figure out how exactly to extract similar amount of money out of the Ukrainian resources of any type, probably not specifically the rare earth minerals, there are not much of them in Ukraine. But he needs to show his audience, his electorate that he is fulfilling his pledge first to finish the war, and then to basically reimburse American budget on all the costs that Americans have been taking to support Ukraine in this crisis. He is trying to present a very swift success. He forced Zelensky, whom he blamed several times that he should step down, he's a dictator, his support rating is very low, that he basically has to do anything that United States tells him to do, to support his political lifeline.

Zelensky has a tough job to somehow not disappoint President Trump, but also not to do something that would be called a betrayal of national interest by the Ukrainians. And that's a tough spot. He is coming to Washington right now (this segment was recorded on Friday). It looks likely that the agreement is finished, because they would not meet otherwise if it's not finished. But let's see whether it would return the revenue for the American taxpayers, because extraction of materials from the Ukrainian soil will require peace, will require stability, will require predictable relations with Russia.

That is basically the prerequisite of any significant economic deals between Ukraine and anybody else.

Trump's instinct about reimbursing American expenses is very significant. He is trying to figure out how to do it properly. He has this major agreement with Ukraine, but maybe the extraction point would be not Ukraine per se, but some of the European or Global South companies that would come and would require American protection to fulfill some of the projects.

He is very experimental in his nature, and he likes to do things that have not been done previously. He doesn't follow the code in this respect. I think that he is creatively searching how exactly it can look like.

Jersey Lee

A primary Ukrainian concern for ceasefire negotiations is that, given the failure of the Budapest memorandum to actually support Ukraine today, it would need more ironclad security guarantees against future Russian advances.

What kind of security guarantees, from the Russian perspective, do you think would be appropriate and acceptable for Ukraine? On the other hand, what kind of security guarantees might Russia like from NATO and the West? Do you think they would be feasible in practice?

Andrey Sushentsov

The Budapest memorandum was a product of Ukraine agreeing on the removal of the Soviet nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory. They were never Ukrainian nuclear weapons. They were soviet nuclear weapons. Ukraine couldn't have navigated them separately without Moscow’s consent. And that was the point of agreement between the United States and Russia that the nuclear weapons should have been withdrawn, not only from Ukraine, but also from Belarus and Kazakhstan. It is incorrect to perceive the Budapest memorandum as somehow multilateral security guarantees, binding security guarantees from all of Ukraine’s neighbor and the United States.

What is more important, is that Ukraine crisis is not about Russia and Ukraine solely. It is primarily about Russia and NATO expansion to the east. It's not Russia that is coming closer to NATO’s border. It's NATO that is approaching Russia every year, through the color revolutions in the post-soviet space, in the overthrowing of the Yanukovich government in Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine has become a battleground between Russia and the West, and Ukrainian governments who opted on inviting western influence in Ukraine, who opted for the creation of a Western instrument out of Ukraine. Basically, they were the people who have prohibited any security guarantees to Ukraine, and that is the proper perspective to perceive these things.

The crisis can have its resolution if the United States and Russia would agree about the structure of security in Europe, because basically, they are the most important interlocutors on this matter.

A lot of European countries who are lacking strategic perspective and responsibility, many of them act very belligerently and unconsciously, they are not resembling their ancestors who witnessed the horrors of the second world war in Europe, and who had the sense of responsibility about what can come if you are wrong with words, if you are wrong with your actions, if you are wrong in your strategy, how difficult and tragic this war can look like.

Observing current European politicians, you just see a group of elites who are strategically inexperienced, very emotional and sentimental, and doesn't see the consequences of their actions.

For a durable peace to settle in the Eastern part of Europe, Russia and the United States have to agree on the rules of conduct. Russia has numerously spoken about those rules of conduct, the last time in December of 2021. This would require a neutral, demilitarized Ukraine that is supporting, not preventing, the use of Russian language in Ukraine, permits citizens of the Christian Orthodox church to follow their religion, permits them to worship the monuments of their fallen ancestors during the Great Patriotic War. That is not just a symbolic gesture, it's a matter of the significant civil resistance inside Ukraine currently. And if this issue is not being taken seriously, it would still be the most important question that could lead to another flare up of this Ukraine crisis.

Jersey Lee

You spoke a little about the possible European security architecture. You also mentioned issues with the mentality of European leaders. So number one, what role do you expect Europeans to play in this European security architecture? Specifically, the EU, because when you were talking about this issue, you were just talking about the US and Russia coming to an agreement. So does the EU countries have any role in this?

Also, do you expect them to change their mentality, to actually come to a compromise with Russia?

Andrey Sushentsov

In upheaval events like this, it's very important to maintain strategic autonomy and strategic sovereignty. This means that the country and elite should be able to independently assess what is its vital interests, how it can support them, what resources it can devote to support those interests, what kind of a risk it can adopt to fulfill its interests, how sovereign is this decision-making process.

It is hard for me to explain what part of Europe is currently sovereign, thinking independently on itself. I would probably say that Turkey, since part of it is in Europe, Turkey is a sovereign state. Turkey thinks about itself, about its interests. It has resources to support them, it has very able armed forces, it has its own significant arms programs, it is very active, it is quite neutral in this crisis, it proposes a peace settlement plan. Speaking about Great Britain, Poland, Baltic states, Scandinavia, we see a lot of belligerents, emotionality, sentiments, black and white thinking there. And they are caught by surprise by these Donald Trump movements to have a separate peace talks with Russia.

I don't see any interest on involving them in these negotiations right now. Bigger countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain also got caught by surprise on this. They have not yet appointed negotiator on their sides who can become a negotiator on the Ukraine crisis. It looks like the beginning of this crisis, December 2021, February 2022, when the United States outmaneuvered all of them, basically enrolled, mobilized all of the European countries into the project of Ukraine victory, and everybody, besides maybe little few like Hungary, everybody subscribed. Nobody has asked questions, what are the risks, how costly it can be, how lengthy it could be? What if Russia will win? Why has nobody asked those questions? And by doing so, European nations have currently put themselves in a very difficult position. They are not sovereign per se, they don't have a separate vision from the United States. They are too emotional and less rationalistic than they need to be to discuss proper peace material.

And I hope that in the future, they would reconsider this very emotional, blind attitude to their strategic thinking, particularly smaller countries that have suffered the most from this crisis like Finland, previously neutral country who have benefited from relations with Russia, heavily benefited being a bridge between Russia and the West, currently joining NATO, closing border with Russia, have significant costs for those political actions, strategically very poorly calculated actions. There’s currently a deadlock in its economy. And it is not clear for Moscow why exactly should these countries be present in the negotiation table.

Jersey Lee

Do you think that the Trump administration's more hostile approach towards Europe, exemplified by JD Vance speech at the Munich Security Conference, may actually be intended to help Europe change their attitude? Or was it simply, as most people interpreted it, a broad-based attack on European values? Regardless of whether it was intended to help the Europeans, do you think it would actually be able to jolt the Europeans into action or strategic autonomy, and changing their general strategic mentality?

Andrey Sushentsov

I don't think that the United States are interested in a strategically autonomous Europe. They like that they’re still being subdued by themselves. They want them to follow the elite of the United States. They just want Europe to be more rational and realistic and less emotional and less sentimental.

Europe is blindsided by its ideological drive, and it prevents European elites to see the reality. German elites forbid themselves to ask questions who exactly blew up the Nord Stream. They just stop themselves from asking these questions, because they don't want to be hurt by their answer. The answer can be so dramatic to them that it can traumatize them. What if our allies, the Americans, have blown up the Nord stream? And that is absolutely a devastating blow to the allied relations. Since this type of discussion is not possible currently in Germany, why should we consider that a country that stops itself from asking reasonable questions be present at the negotiation table?

Jersey Lee

Do you think that the US even wants a more rational Europe, since the previously “more emotional” Europe was also the one that made itself fully reliant on the US, so from the Trump administration's perspective, why would they want to change that?

Andrey Sushentsov

They want to have a more common-minded elite. They see a common enemy in the elites, which can be called a globalistic elite, that are thinking outside of the national borders, outside of the national interests. And Trump considers this type of elites as personal enemies. He thinks that those elites are leading their countries in the wrong direction, toward deindustrialization, toward family values that ruin societies, towards belligerent posture, military crisis, et cetera. He wants to have more common-minded partners in European elites. That's how I understand what they did at the Munich security conference.

Jersey Lee

Moving back to Trump's foreign policy approach. Right now, in America, there are two main theories for what he's trying to do. One is a transaction approach to extract benefits from everyone, including allies that are seen as freeloading off American goodwill and American support; another is that he wants to achieve a broader rethink of the global order, perhaps a move towards carving up the world into spheres of influence with China, Russia and perhaps other countries. Which one do you think is more likely? And also, how do you think Russia and China should respond to this new potential change?

Andrey Sushentsov

Trump is trying to multiply national power of the United States. He sees the new resource for multiplying its national power in extracting value from the allies. He is manipulating the instruments of security guarantees, of financial control, of monetary policy that were presented by previous American administration as common goods. The United States have usually been saying to allies, those are common goods. Those are basically the circumstances that permits everybody to prosper.

Now, Trump says, no, they are not common goods. They are our instruments, and you are not paying enough for using them. And his discussion about Greenland, about Canada, about Panama, about the European gold reserve, part of them are actually being held in the United States, about the European military expenditures that should be to a significant extent delivered to United States to buy new stocks of weapons, about European purchases of American energy, et cetera. He is trying, to some extent, to cannibalize allies, because he understands that in these new environments, where major powers operate in a competitive way, he needs to strengthen his hands in the competition in Asia. Primarily, he sees China as his competitor.

Russia and China in this situation should pursue the same routes our two countries have been following since the end of the 90s, when the joined Russia China chapter on multipolarity, a new world order was signed in 1997, where we establish new type of relations not directed against third countries, aimed at establishing a stable international structure that is sustainable enough to avoid interference from a country like United States. Our major task for the upcoming decade or two is to build a security architecture in Eurasia that is durable and unalterable by the United States.

Jersey Lee

What are some commonalities and potential contradictions between Russia's concept of Eurasian Security Architecture with China's Global Security Initiative? How can we better mesh the two ideas?

Andrey Sushentsov

The most important similarity is that Russia and China see that external influence in Eurasia is unnecessary, that local powers can fix local problems. We do not need any maritime power like United States or Great Britain or anybody else to meddle in regional affairs, trying to offshore balance parties, trying to stage color revolutions, disrupt, seed conflicts, et cetera. That is the basis of the common vision of Russia and China on what should our continent look like. Americans for centuries have been delivering a strategy of dividing and conquering separate powers in different regions. We see that they are successfully balancing weaker and stronger countries in different parts of Eurasia, making themselves somehow indispensable.

The joint efforts of Russia and China should be to make the United States not that indispensable, that we can bring peace, stability, and prosperity to our home continent, Eurasia, without any external interference.

Jersey Lee

Let's assume that the current negotiations are successful and a ceasefire eventually comes in the coming months to Ukraine. How do you think Russia, China ties will evolve? What role might the people to people and public opinion in both countries play?

Andrey Sushentsov

Russia and China have dramatically strengthened their relations throughout several past years. We are probably experiencing the apex of our bilateral relations, and we should put all efforts to make this durable foundation of the new era of the Russia and China relations in the 21st century.

I'm sure that it will happen. We have a proper political will on both sides. We have a very strong economic foundation for this. We have great affinity between peoples of our countries, we see a significant number of cultural exchanges and tourist visits, we see a great interest in history and culture of both countries, we see a significant cooperation in the cultural field, in cinema, in music and festivals. Moscow, for the second year in a row, is celebrating Chinese New Year, and it's a very a brilliant manifestation of the friendship between our two countries.

I am sure that Ukrainian crisis is just one point that made those relations very specific, but it's not the only one. We have a common destiny on making Eurasia safe and prosperous in the 21st century. As two great nations, two great civilizations, two great neighbors, we have a special responsibility towards one another, and toward peace and stability on our continent.

Jersey Lee

In a slightly earlier interview, US Secretary of state Marco Rubio said that US strategy is not intended to split Russia and China, which he believes is not likely to succeed, but that the Trump playbook is merely to make sure that Russia isn't dependent on China. What's your thoughts on his remarks?

Andrey Sushentsov

I think he understands that Russia and China relations are unique in nature and cannot be split by any third country, that Russia has a deep and comprehensive interest in developing understanding with China and vice versa. They understand that they would like to find ways to make Russia-Chinese relation less strategic, less important. And I don't think that they would be successful in it, because they’re two great neighbors and two nations with compatible economies. Both economies have a lot of materials and products that are required by the partner economy. Russia and China also develop a common vision for the 21st century as a polycentric system where several different major power gravity centers compete in a way that is structuring the system and prevents significant crisis.

But it's clear that the Americans are intending to develop the containment policy toward China in the Pacific Ocean. They want to withdraw some of their forces from Europe and concentrate on this task of containing China. And one of their aims is to influence Russia in a way that Russia would be less supportive toward China, but I don't think that they would succeed in it.

Jersey Lee

How can Russia and China respond to these attempts by the US to split the two countries?

Andrey Sushentsov

Russia has its own goals and designs in the relations with the United States. They are still in a very significant crisis. We are only beginning excavation process of those relations. We are discussing how diplomatic property can return, how the diplomatic staff can be enlarged to the proper levels they have been since 2016, 2017. There are very limited instruments of American influence over Russia. This is due to the legacy of the Biden administration, hundreds of sanctions imposed on Russia, attempts to inflict Russia's strategic defeat in Ukraine. I think Americans tried everything to affect Russia's interest, to no results essentially. It's very hard for me to figure out what they can do to force Russia to do what they want.

Jersey Lee

We've been focusing mostly on Eurasia, but throughout the Ukraine war, Russia has made moves to dramatically expand its engagement with the Global South. Again, assuming that the Ukraine war comes to a ceasefire, will this engagement be changed in any way? How will this intersect with China's approach towards the Global South countries?

Andrey Sushentsov

What is important is that current negotiations between Russia and United States are happening, not because Russia has changed its course, not because it recognized that it was wrong. No. United states have recognized that they were wrong, that their strategy on inflicting strategic defeat on Russia is wrong, that brought the world to the edge of the nuclear war. Donald Trump had the courage to claim that Biden’s strategy, Sullivan, Blinken, all those guys, they were wrong. They were driving United States recklessly into direct crisis, direct confrontation with Russia.

And Moscow says that Russia's vision on the development of this crisis, on the achievements of its goals was proper, that Russia was correct in its assessments, which was that a foundation for the development of the 21st century lies not with Europe, but with the Global Majority countries, or Global South, with Russia's allies and partners in different parts of the world. Europe is in political shambles. Europe doesn't know where its heart lies, don't know where its interests lie, it cannot permit itself to ask important questions, it is still searching for itself. And even though Russia is culturally European, it sees that, in terms of the strategy and its future, Russia belongs to a developing Global Majority that is swiftly moving toward prosperity. I'm sure that Russian foreign policy would be aimed at strengthening all those ties that Russia has been building for several decades, particularly in the last few years.